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3Preface
The thesis analyses three different, yet interconnected, issues of environmental externalities: how structural changes may deteri-
orate natural resources and workers’ welfare, how policy instruments may reduce environmental corruption, and how foreign direct
invests may affect pollution level and land owners’ welfare of a local economy. The study of these three issues is crucial in several
developing countries characterized by ill-defined property rights on natural resources, on interaction with institutions, on protection
against pollution, and high levels of inequality. The tool used is economic dynamics, more specifically, two-sector growth models
and evolutionary games.
Introduction
The first paper, titled Disequilibrium ecological dynamics, structural change and inter-sectoral mobility in a two-sector econ-
omy, studies the dynamics of a two-sector economy (with a natural resource-dependent sector and an industrial sector) characterized
by free inter-sectoral labor mobility and heterogenity of agents (workers and entrepreneurs). In such a context, we analyze the ef-
fects of the deterioration of natural resources, caused by the production activity of both sectors, on inter-sectoral movements of the
labor force (structural changes), on ecological dynamics and on the revenues of workers and entrepreneurs. As in the seminal work
by Matsuyama (1992), we obtain that a low productivity of labor in the resource-dependent sector can fuel the industrialization
process. However, differently from Matsuyama (1992), in our model the industrialization process may give rise to a reduction in
workers’ revenues if the contribution to environmental depletion of the industrial sector, per unit of product, is higher than that of
the resource-dependent one.
The second paper, titled Green licenses and environmental corruption: a random matching model, studies environmental cor-
ruption via a random matching evolutionary game between a population of firms and a population of bureaucrats in order to release
a “green” license. A firm obtains the license if the bureaucrat checks that it complies with environmental regulations, otherwise
it is sanctioned. In this model there are two types of bureaucrats (honest and dishonest), two types of firms (compliant and not
compliant), and two types of crimes (corruption and extortion). Corruption is when a dishonest bureaucrat accepts a bribe from a
not compliant firm, while extortion is when a dishonest bureaucrat extorts a bribe from a compliant firm. When there is no domi-
nance of strategies, we obtain two bistable regimes, in which two attractive stationary states exist, and two regimes with an internal
stable equilibrium, which corresponds to the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the one-shot static game, surrounded by closed
trajectories. Moreover, from the comparative statics of the last two dynamic regimes emerges that policy instruments can help the
Public Administration to reduce both corruption and extortion, though increasing sanctions, probability of being sanctioned and
inspection effort do not always get the desired results.
The third paper, titled Foreign direct investments, land rent, and pollution in a local economy, studies the possible effects
of foreign direct investments in land on the development of a local economy. To this aim, we use a two-sector model (external
and local) with heterogeneous agents: external investors and local land owners. The dynamics is given by the accumulation of
pollution and local physical capital, while the external physical capital accumulation is driven by foreign direct investments. We
assume that both sectors are negatively affected by pollution, but only the external sector is polluting. The local government can
tax its production activities to finance environmental defensive expenditures. We compute local agents revenues via numerical
simulations analysis. A welfare-improving growth path may occur only if the pollution tax is high enough and the impact of the
external sector on pollution is low enough, since the revenues of local land owners depend inversely on pollution level. Otherwise,
a welfare-reducing growth path may occur, and foreign direct investments decrease the revenues of local land owners.
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Abstract
This paper studies the dynamics of a two-sector economy (with a natural resource-dependent sector and an industrial sector)
characterized by free inter-sectoral labor mobility and heterogenity of agents (workers and entrepreneurs). In such a context, we
analyze the effects of the deterioration of natural resources, caused by the production activity of both sectors, on inter-sectoral
movements of the labor force (structural changes), on ecological dynamics and on the revenues of workers and entrepreneurs. As
in the seminal work by Matsuyama (1992), we obtain that a low productivity of labor in the resource-dependent sector can fuel the
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a reduction in workers’ revenues if the contribution to environmental depletion of the industrial sector, per unit of product, is higher
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1. Introduction
In 2011, nearly 50 percent of the population in developing
countries lived in areas classified as urban, compared with less
than 30 percent in the 1980s (World Bank, 2013). This means
that in the last three decades there has been a significant migra-
tion from rural to urban areas. This phenomenon is, in many
cases, associated to a structural change (SC) determined by a
movement of labor force and production activities from natu-
ral resource-dependent sectors towards manufacturing sectors.
It is often argued that SCs are cause and consequence of eco-
nomic development and growth (see, e.g., Lewis, 1955; Ranis
and Fei, 1961; Lucas, 2004), exactly as it happened in Europe in
the nineteenth century due to the Industrial Revolution (Bade,
2008).
The main reason why many workers leave rural areas is the
hope of improving their condition, escaping from a situation of
poverty or unemployment, and attracted by a higher wage rate.
In economic growth theory, there are two main explanations of
the structural changes: the changing of consumer preferences
(demand-side) and the technological innovation (supply-side).
In the first case (Kongsamut et al., 2001), as income rises, the
representative consumer increases manufacture and service de-
mand, and reduces agricultural one; this modifies the produc-
tion system and, hence, the composition of the labor force. In
the second case (Acemoglu and Guerrieri, 2008), the techno-
logical innovation, lower in traditional sectors, rises profits and
wages in the secondary and tertiary sectors, with a consequent
increase of investments and labor force employment in such
sectors.
Whatever is the cause of SCs, there is general agreement
that SCs are an integral part of the economic growth process
in developing countries and that they produce improvements
in welfare of economic agents. For instance, Bretschger and
Smulders (2012) argue that the process of intra-sectoral migra-
tion can lead to a level of technology that allows the sustain-
ability of growth itself, also in an economy with exhaustible
resources and low elasticity of substitution between natural re-
sources and man-made inputs. Other economists, as Pasche
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(2002), claim that it is possible having beneficial effects, thanks
to technological improvements, only in the short term, while
in the long term the sustainability is guaranteed only through a
decrease in consumption and wealth.
However, an increasing share of literature on SCs deals
with the negative effects on welfare due to the depletion of
free access-natural resources which, in some cases, accompa-
nies SCs. López (2003, 2007) and Antoci et al. (2010, 2012,
2014) argue that environmental degradation, caused by the ex-
pansion of the industrial sector, may fuel a self-enforcing pro-
cess of structural change determined by a decrease in produc-
tivity in the traditional resource-based sector. In such a context,
the industrialization process is often associated with growing
problems of environmental degradation, declining or stagnant
wages and the perpetuation of poverty. López (2007) refers to
these cases as perverse structural changes.
Natural resources degradation is a serious problem in sev-
eral developing countries characterized by ill-defined property
rights on natural resources and high levels of inequality. Envi-
ronmental degradation is playing a key role especially in those
countries where strong growth rates have been observed in re-
cent years, such as India and China, where many citizens are
forced to change their behavior to defend themselves against
the pollution effects of the industrialization process (Economy,
2004; World Bank, 2007; Dhamodharam and Swaminathan,
2010; Boopathi and Rameshkumar, 2011; Deng and Yang,
2013; Holdaway, 2013).
This paper analyses the dynamics of a two-sector economy
(with a natural resource-dependent sector and an industrial
sector) characterized by free inter-sectoral labor mobility and
heterogeneity of agents (workers and entrepreneurs). In such a
context, we study the effects of the deterioration of natural re-
sources, caused by the activity of both sectors, on inter-sectoral
movements of labour force (structural changes), on ecological
dynamics and on workers and entrepreneurs revenues. In our
model, as in the seminal work by Matsuyama (1992), a low
productivity of labour in the resource-dependent sector can be
the engine of the industrialization process. However, differ-
ently from Matsuyama (1992), we assume that the industrial-
ization process generates environmental degradation and, con-
sequently, a reduction in labour productivity in the resource-
dependent sector. This may give rise to a self-enforcing pro-
cess according to which the expansion of the industrial sector
generates, via an increase in environmental degradation, a re-
duction in labour productivity in the resource-dependent sec-
tor and therefore leads workers to move from the resource-
dependent sector towards the industrial one; the consequent fur-
ther expansion of the industrial sector generates further environ-
mental degradation and reduction in labour productivity in the
resource-dependent sector, and so on. In such a context, the ex-
pansion of the industrial sector, at the expenses of the resource-
dependent one, may be associated to a decrease in workers’
revenues and an increase in entrepreneurs’ revenues; that is to
an increase in inequality between the two classes of economic
agents. Our study starts from the framework proposed by An-
toci et al. (2014), but introduces some crucial differences. More
specifically, in Antoci et al. (2014), the polluting sector is the
industrial sector and not the resource-dependent sector, while
in this paper we assume that both sectors negatively affect en-
vironmental resources. Furthermore, we augment the model
of Antoci et al. (2014) by introducing inter-sectoral dynamics
from one sector to the other; labor allocation dynamics is deter-
mined by the difference between the wage rate in the industrial
sector and the per capita output in the resource-dependent sec-
tor.1 Augmenting the two-dimensional dynamic system anal-
ysed in Antoci et al. (2014), by the introduction of inter-sectoral
dynamics, we obtain a dynamics which takes place in a three-
dimensional box of the plane (K,N, E), where K is the capi-
tal stock, N the number of workers employed in the traditional
resource-dependent sector, E the stock of an environmental re-
source. In this context we prove that, differently from Antoci
et al. (2014), the stationary state in which both sectors coexist
can be attractive only if it corresponds to a structural change
which improves workers’ welfare. However we also show, as
in Antoci et al. (2014), that, if the contribution to environmen-
tal depletion of the natural resource-dependent sector is be-
low a given threshold value, then there always exist trajectories
converging to a stationary state where the economy becomes
specialized in the industrial sector (that is, the variable N ap-
proaches the value 0) and a structural change occurs character-
ized by a reduction in workers’ welfare.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is presented
in Section 2. Section 3 contains local analysis, Section 4 deal
with global analysis, Section 5 studies the welfare properties of
the stationary states and Section 6 concludes.
2. Set up of the model
We examine a small open economy with two sectors -the E-
sector and the I-sector-, free inter-sectoral labour mobility and
heterogeneous agents. The production activity in the E-sector is
based on a free-access environmental resource, while the pro-
duction in the I-sector is based on the stock of physical cap-
ital accumulated in the economy. Economic agents belong to
two different communities, one made of "workers", the other of
"industrial entrepreneurs". The former are endowed only with
their own working capacity and use it either in the E-sector or
working as employees of the industrial entrepreneurs in the I-
sector. In turn, the latter, who own physical capital and hire
labour force, produce industrial goods.
The economy we consider is small and open, therefore the
prices of the goods produced in both sectors can be considered
as exogenously determined regardless of what happens in the
economy. For simplicity, it is assumed that entrepreneurs do
not invest in the E-sector, the latter being composed of small
firms each of which is run by a worker.
The aggregated production functions of the E- and I-sectors
1In the model of Antoci et al. (2014), instantaneous adjustment of the labour
market is assumed; that is, in each instant of time, the allocation of labour
force between the two sectors of the economy is such that the wage rate in the
industrial sector equals per capita output in the resource-dependent sector.
6
Ph.D. thesis of Gianluca Iannucci (1), 5-14
are given, respectively, by:
YI = (N − N)αK1−α 1 > α > 0, N > 0 (1)
YE = βNE β > 0 (2)
where the variable N ∈ [0,N] (respectively, N − N) represents
the labour force employed in the E-sector (respectively, the I-
sector) and the parameter N represents the size of the popula-
tion of workers; E is the stock of a free-access natural resource
and K is the aggregated stock of physical capital accumulated
by the entrepreneurs; the parameter β is a measure of produc-
tivity in the E-sector. The production function (2) was proposed
by Schaefer (1957) for fishery and is widely used in modelling
production processes based on the exploitation of natural re-
sources (Munro and Scott, 1993; Conrad, 1996; Brander and
Taylor, 1998; McAusland, 2005; López, 2010).
The dynamics of the variables K, E and N is assumed to be
represented by the three-dimensional dynamic system:
K˙ = s
[
(N − N)αK1−α − w(N − N)
]
− dK
N˙ = γ
(YE
N
− w
)
E˙ = E(E − E) − δYE − εYI
(3)
with the non negativity constraints E ≥ 0 and N ≥ 0, where
YE/N = βE and w represent, respectively, per capita output in
the E-sector and wage rate in the I-sector, which is assumed
coinciding with marginal productivity of N − N: w = α(N −
N)α−1K1−α. The parameter E > 0 measures the carrying ca-
pacity of the environmental resource; the parameters δ > 0 and
ε > 0 represent, respectively, the negative effects on E of the
production activities of the E- and I-sectors; the parameters s,
d ∈ (0, 1) measure, respectively, the propensity to save of en-
trepreneurs and the depreciation rate of K.
We assume that each economic agent takes aggregate pro-
ductions YE and YI as exogenously given. Consequently, both
sectors produce environmental negative externalities that eco-
nomic agents are not able to internalize due to coordination
problems. This assumption plays a crucial role in shaping the
results of our model. Environmental externalities affect eco-
nomic activities especially in developing countries, where prop-
erty rights tend to be ill-defined and ill-protected, environmen-
tal protection institutions and regulations are weak and natural
resources are more fragile than in developed countries, which
are located in temperate areas instead than in tropical and sub-
tropical regions.
In the above-described context, we will analyse the dynam-
ics generated by the system (3) and we will show how they
depend on the relative level of carrying capacity E and the en-
vironmental pressures (measured by the parameters δ and ε) of
the economic activities.
3. Local analysis
By substituting YE/N = βE and w = α(N − N)α−1K1−α in
system (3), this can be written as
K˙ = s(1 − α)(N − N)αK1−α − dK
N˙ = γ
[
βE − α(N − N)α−1K1−α
]
E˙ = E(E − E) − δβNE − ε(N − N)αK1−α
(4)
In order to find possible stationary states of system (4) in the
open box B = (0,K) × (0,N) × (0, E) and study their sta-
bility properties, we consider a suitable choice of the units of
measurement, which leads to a rescaling of (4). Precisely, set
K = ηK′, E = µE′, E = µE
′
such that dηα = s (1 − α),
βµ = αη1−α. Renaming K′, E′, E
′
as K, E, E and rescaling
t by setting t′ = µt, the system becomes
K˙ = lK1−α
[
(N − N)α − Kα
]
·
N = m
[
E − (N − N)α−1K1−α
]
·
E = E(E − E) − pNE − q(N − N)αK1−α
(5)
where, with respect to system (4), l = d
µ
, m = βγ, p = βδ
µ
,
q = εη
1−α
µ2
=
βε
αµ
, µ = α[s(1−α)]
1−α
α
βd
1−α
α
. In fact the above rescaling
of K and E amounts to choosing the unit of measurement of K
as the capital stock per worker (so that K = N ) and the unit of
measurement of E in such a way that the wage per worker in the
two sectors is measured by the same unit. Moreover, it follows
from the above expression of E˙ that p and q can be interpreted,
respectively, as the contribution to the environmental depletion
per unit of product of the traditional and the industrial sector.
Then straightforward computations lead to the following result.
Proposition 1.
1. There exists one and exactly one stationary state of sys-
tem (5) in the box B = (0,N)2 × (0, E) if and only
if p , q and there exists λ, 0 < λ < 1, such that
E = 1 + λpN + (1 − λ) qN. Then the stationary state
is the point P˜ = (K,N, E) =
(
(1 − λ) N, λN, 1
)
.
2. If p = q and E = 1 + pN = 1 + qN,
then the stationary states in B fill the segment{
K = N − N, 0 < N < N, E = 1
}
.
3. In all the other cases there is no stationary state of (5) in
B.
The E-sector and the I-sector coexist in the stationary state
P˜, the strictly positive values λ and 1 − λ measuring the shares,
in a population of size N, of workers employed in the E-sector
and in the I-sector, respectively. Since the rescaling of K
amounts to choosing the unit of measurement of K as the capital
stock per worker (so that K = N), the value of K at P˜ coincides
with the number of workers employed in the I-sector, that is
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K = N − N = (1 − λ) N. According to Proposition 1, P˜ ex-
ists if and only if the carrying capacity E of the environmental
resource is neither “too high” nor “too low”, that is
1 + min
(
pN, qN
)
< E < 1 + max
(
pN, qN
)
(6)
Hence the stationary state P˜ exists if the value of the carry-
ing capacity E belongs to an interval whose extremes are de-
termined by the size N of the population of workers and by the
contributions to environmental depletion, per unit of product,
of the E-sector (measured by p ) and of the I-sector (measured
by q ). Notice that, given N , such interval expands if the dif-
ference between the values of p and q increases; therefore the
set of values of E implying the existence of P˜ expands if the
heterogeneity between the two sectors, with respect to the envi-
ronmental impact, increases. Now, assume that one stationary
state P˜ =
(
N − N˜, N˜, 1
)
exists in B. Then the Jacobian matrix
is easily computed to be
J(P˜) =

−lα −lα 0
−m(1−α)
N−N˜
−m(1−α)
N−N˜ m
−q (1 − α) −p + qα E − 2 − pN˜

and the following proposition holds.
Proposition 2. Assume system (5) has one stationary state P˜ =(
N − N˜, N˜, 1
)
∈ B . Then:
1. if p < q, P˜ is either a saddle with a two-dimensional
stable manifold or a source;
2. if p > q, P˜ is either a sink or a saddle with a one-
dimensional stable manifold.
3. All the previous cases can occur.
Proof. Straightforward computations yield
det J(P˜) = lmα (q − p)
i.e. sgn
[
det J(P˜)
]
= sgn (q − p), which proves the first two
statements of the proposition. As to the third one, easy compu-
tations show that:
• Let l = m = 1, p = 2, q = 1, α = 0.5,N = 4, E = 5.8.
Then the stationary state P˜ = (3.2, 0.8, 1) is a saddle with
a one-dimensional stable manifold (in fact, traceJ(P˜) >
0).
• Let l = m = 1, p = 2, q = 1, α = 0.5,N = 4, E =
8.2. Then the stationary state P˜ = (0.8, 3.2, 1) is a sink
(Routh-Hurwicz conditions imply that J(P˜) has three
eigenvalues with negative real part).
• Let l = m = 1, p = 1, q = 2, α = 0.1,N = 4, E = 5.8.
Then the stationary state P˜ = (0.8, 3.2, 1) is a saddle with
a two-dimensional stable manifold (in fact, traceJ(P˜) <
0).
• Let l = m = 0.1, p = 1, q = 2, α = 0.1,N = 4, E = 5.8.
Then the stationary state P˜ = (0.8, 3.2, 1) is a source
(Routh-Hurwicz conditions imply that J(P˜) has three
eigenvalues with positive real part). 
According to the above proposition, the stationary state P˜ -
where both sectors coexist - can be locally attractive only if the
contribution to environmental depletion, per unit of product, of
the E-sector (measured by p) is higher than that of the I-sector
(measured by q). In order to get an intuitive idea of what mech-
anism generates such result, take into account that, in the con-
text p < q, an increase in the share of workers employed in the
I-sector (i.e. an increase of N − N ) produces a higher envi-
ronmental degradation and, consequently, a reduction of labor
productivity in the E-sector. Workers defend themselves from
the reduction of labor productivity in the E-sector by increasing
their labor offer to the I-sector. The consequent further expan-
sion of the I-sector produces further environmental degradation
and so on. Such a mechanism is clearly self-enforcing and does
not favour the coexistence between the two sectors. The op-
posite holds if p > q: in such a case, an increase in the share
of workers employed in the I-sector has the effect of reducing
environmental degradation and increasing labor productivity in
the E-sector. Consequently an increase in N − N supports the
relative performance of the E-sector pushing workers out of the
I-sector, which, obviously, favours the coexistence of the two
sectors.
Remark 3. In the bifurcation case p = q, when E =
1 + pN, as we have said, all the points of the segment{
K = N − N, 0 < N < N, E = 1
}
are stationary states. Then it
is easily checked that there exists a value N̂ ∈
(
0,N
)
such that,
when N∗ ∈
(
N̂,N
)
, the stationary state P∗ =
(
N − N∗,N∗, 1
)
is endowed with a two-dimensional stable manifold. Hence for
N∗ ∈
(
N̂,N
)
the phase portrait in the box is stratified.
Remark 4. It is easily observed that the definition of the dy-
namic system (equivalently, by (4) or (5)) implies, for any
choice of the above parameters, the existence of trajectories,
in the box B, reaching either the side E = 0 or the side
N = 0 within a finite time. In fact, take, for example, a point
P0 = (K0,N0, 0), with K0 > 0 and 0 < N0 < N. Consider
the negative trajectory through P0 defined, say, by (5), i.e. Γ(t)
with t ≤ 0 and Γ(0) = P0. Then, for 0 > t ≥ −ε, ε being
sufficiently small, Γ(t) ∈ B. Called Γ(−ε)= Pε, it follows that
the positive trajectory from Pε reaches the side E = 0 at the
time ε. Clearly an analogous argument applies if we consider
a point Q0 = (K0, 0, E0) , such that K0, E0 > 0, E0 <
(
K0N
)1−α
(implying N˙(Q0) < 0 ). We also observe that some trajectories
leaving the box through N = 0 may get back into the box, which
cannot occur for those reaching (in a finite time) E = 0.
4. Global analysis: one stationary state
4.1. The case p < q
Let us assume that one stationary state P˜ in B exists. As
observed in Remark 4, even if P˜ is a sink (implying p > q),
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there exist trajectories reaching in a finite time the boundary of
the box B (i.e. the sides N = 0 or E = 0). So the question
arises: when p < q, there still exists a sub-region (i.e. an open
connected subset) whose trajectories remain in the box for all
t > 0, that is a positively invariant region?
In fact the following results provide a positive answer.
Assume
(A1) E = 1 +
[
λp + (1 − λ) q] N (i.e. P˜ exists), p < q
Then we prove
Lemma 5. Suppose that (A1) holds and that a trajectory lying
in B, say Γ (t) = (K (t) ,N (t) , E (t)), is such that there exists an
increasing sequence of times tn > 0 for which lim
tn→T
K (tn) = 0.
Then T = +∞ and there exists t > 0 such that ·K (t) < 0 as
t ∈
(
t,+∞
)
.
Proof. Assume that along a trajectory Γ (t) =
(K (t) ,N (t) , E (t)) lying in B there exists an increasing
sequence of times tn > 0 such that lim
tn→T
K (tn) = 0, T ≤ +∞.
First of all we show that K (tn) cannot keep oscillating. In
fact, in such a case there should be a sequence of maxima,
say K′n = K
(
t′n
)
, and a sequence of minima, say K′′n = K
(
t′′n
)
,
with t′n, t′′n → T and K′n,K′′n → 0. Pose Γ
(
t′n
)
=
(
K′n,N′n, E′n
)
,
Γ
(
t′′n
)
=
(
K′′n ,N′′n , E′′n
)
. Then N′n = N − K′n, N′′n = N − K′′n ,
E′′n < 1 < E′n. Therefore we can assume t′n < t′′n , in such
a way that at a time tn ∈ (t′n, t′′n ) E (tn) = 1, ·E (tn) < 0,
whereas
·
K (t) < 0 (i.e. N − N(t) < K(t)) as t ∈
(
t′n, tn
)
. Hence
N − N(tn) < K(tn) < K′n. It follows that, for a sufficiently high
n,
·
E
(
tn
)
= E − 1 − pN + εn = (1 − λ) (q − p) N + εn > 0, since
εn → 0 as n → +∞, thus leading to a contradiction. Hence,
if a trajectory Γ (t) lying in B satisfies the assumption of the
Lemma, then there exists T , 0 < T ≤ +∞, such that along
Γ (t) lim
t→T K
(t) = 0 and
·
K (t) < 0 as t ∈
(
t; T
)
, t ≥ 0, implying
lim
t→T N
(t) = N. Pose [K (t)]α = H(t),
[
N − N(t)
]α
= ν (t). Then
·
H (t) = αl [ν (t) − H (t)]
so that, for t > 0, H(t) = H(0)e−αlt + αle−αlt
t∫
0
eαlsν (s) ds,
H(0) > 0. Therefore lim
t→T K
(t) = 0 clearly implies T = +∞.

Theorem 6. Given assumption (A1), consider the segment
Σ =
{
K = N − N, λN < N < N, E = 1
}
(7)
Then all the trajectories starting from points of Σ tend, as t →
+∞, to the boundary point P̂ =
(
0,N, Ê
)
, where Ê = E − pN =
1 + (1 − λ) (q − p) N.
Proof. First of all, consider a trajectory Γ (t) starting from a
point of Σ, that is Γ (0) = P0 =
(
N − N0,N0, 1
)
, λN < N0 < N.
Then it is easily computed that
·
K(0) =
··
K(0) =
·
N(0) = 0 and
·
E(0) > 0, implying
··
N(0) > 0 and
···
K(0) < 0. Hence, in a right
neighborhood of t = 0,
·
K(t) < 0, that is N − N (t) < K (t).
So, set K0 = N − N0, consider first the case 0 < K0 <
E−1−pN
q =
(1−λ)(q−p)
q N. If the trajectory from such a P0 should
cross again the plane E = 1, say at P1 = (K1,N1, 1), then we
would have N − N1 < K1 < K0. Hence it is easily checked that,
at P1,
·
E > E−1− pN−qK1 > E−1− pN−qK0 > 0, leading to
a contradiction. It follows that along the trajectory K (t) keeps
decreasing, with E (t) > 1 and N − N (t) < K (t). Hence, by
applying the Lemma, it is easily checked that lim
t→+∞K (t) = 0,
lim
t→+∞N (t) = N and limt→+∞E (t) = Ê = 1 + (1 − λ) (q − p) N.
Now, assume by contradiction that among the trajecto-
ries starting from Σ only those from a sub-segment Σ˜ ={
K = N − N, N˜ < N < N, E = 1
}
, λN < N˜, tend to P̂. Hence,
by continuity, also the trajectory from P˜ =
(
N − N˜, N˜, 1
)
tends
to P̂, as it is easily checked. Then, after a sufficiently long time
T > 0, this trajectory will reach a point, say, P1 = (K1,N1, E1),
where 0 < K1 <
(1−λ)(q−p)
2q N, N − N1 < K1, E1 > 1 + (1−λ)(q−p)N2 .
Therefore consider a point of Σ P0 =
(
N − N0,N0, 1
)
, where
λN < N0 < N˜. If N˜ − N0 < ε, ε being sufficiently small,
then the trajectory from P0 will reach at time T , by Gronwall’s
Lemma, a point P2 = (K2,N2, E2), where 0 < K2 <
(1−λ)(q−p)
q N,
N − N2 < K2, E2 > 1 + (1−λ)(q−p)N4 , with
·
K (P2) < 0. Hence
it follows from the above arguments that such a trajectory will
also tend to P̂ as t → +∞. This concludes the proof of the
theorem. 
It follows from the proof itself of the above theorem that
there exists a sub-region of B (containing a tubular neigh-
borhood of Σ) whose trajectories stay in B and converge, as
t → +∞, to P̂. Moreover the equilibrium P˜ belongs to the
boundary of such a region. These facts motivate the following
Conjecture 7. If (A1) holds and P˜ is a saddle, then the two-
dimensional stable manifold of P˜ separates the trajectories of
B leaving in a finite time the box from those which tend, as
t → +∞, to the boundary point P̂.
In fact the previous arguments justify a further conjecture,
namely
Conjecture 8. Suppose (A1) holds and P˜ undergoes a Hopf bi-
furcation, changing from a saddle into a source. Then such a
bifurcation is supercritical, i.e. a limit cycle arises, surround-
ing P˜, endowed with a two-dimensional stable manifold.
What motivates this second conjecture is the fact that, after
the bifurcation takes place, the source P˜ continues to belong to
the boundary of the trajectories tending to P̂, i.e. to the sepa-
ratrix between trajectories staying in, as t → +∞, and leaving
the box. Hence it is reasonable to suppose that such a separatrix
is now the stable manifold of a cycle arisen through the Hopf
bifurcation.
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According to the above results, if p < q (i.e. the contri-
bution to environmental depletion of the I-sector, per unit of
product, is higher than that of the E-sector) and the stationary
state P˜ (in such a context never attractive, see Proposition 2) ex-
ists, then the dynamics is path-dependent, in that more regimes
can occur, depending on the initial conditions of the dynamics
in the box B. In particular:
1. There always exist initial conditions of the variables K,
N, E from which the trajectories reach in a finite time the
side E = 0 of the box B (i.e., the ecological-economic
dynamics leads to total depletion of the environmental
resource). When this happens, we can expect that the
economy will become specialized in the I-sector (that is,
no economic agent works in the E-sector), since labor
productivity in the E-sector is equal to zero when E = 0.
2. Furthermore, there are initial conditions from which the
ecological-economic dynamics leads asymptotically to a
point P̂ =
(
0,N, Ê
)
lying on the boundary of the box B,
where the I-sector disappears (K = 0) and therefore the
economy becomes specialized in the E-sector. The tra-
jectories approaching asymptotically the boundary point
P̂ start from a sub-region of B containing a tubular neigh-
borhood of the segment Σ (see (7)).
Note that the limit boundary point P̂ =
(
0,N, Ê
)
, where
Ê = E − pN, coincides with the unique stationary state with
E > 0 of the one-sector dynamics that would be observed in
absence of the I-sector. In such a context, set K = 0 and N = N,
the evolution of E would be described by the equation
·
E = E(E − E) − pNE (8)
admitting the two stationary states: E = 0 (a source) and E =
Ê = E − pN (a sink).
The above situation is illustrated in Fig. 1, which refers
to the case in which the stationary state P˜ is a saddle with a
two-dimensional stable manifold, showing trajectories tending
(as t → +∞) to the boundary point P̂ or reaching in a finite
time the side E = 0 of the box B. This result is not surpris-
ing, since, when p < q, the dynamics is conditioned by the
self-enforcing mechanism outlined in Section 3, according to
which the expansion of the I-sector generates, via an increase
in environmental degradation, a reduction in labour productiv-
ity in the E-sector and therefore leads workers to move from
the resource-dependent sector towards the industrial one. The
consequent expansion of the I-sector generates further environ-
mental degradation and reduction in labor productivity in the
E-sector, and so on.
4.2. The case p > q
Assume
(A2) E = 1 +
[
λp + (1 − λ) q] N, p > q
Then the unique stationary state P˜ =
(
N − N˜, N˜, 1
)
∈ B is
(generically) either a sink or a saddle with a one-dimensional
0
1
2
3
4
0
1
2
3
4
0
1
2
3
4
5
KN
E
P˜
Pˆ
Fig. 1. Case p < q: l = m = 1, p = 1, q = 2, α = 0.1,N = 4, E = 5.8.
Trajectories approaching the boundary point P̂ and trajectories reaching, in a
finite time, the side E = 0 of the box B, in the context in which the stationary
state P˜ = (0.8, 3.2, 1) is a saddle with a two-dimensional stable manifold.
stable manifold and both cases can occur, as showed in Sec-
tion 3. In fact, the question arises: when, by suitably varying
one parameter of the system (e.g., α, l, E), P˜ changes stability
and thus, generically, a Hopf bifurcation occurs, what is the na-
ture - supercritical or subcritical - of such bifurcation? Actually
we don’t have an analytic demonstration, but several numerical
experiments suggest that the Hopf bifurcation is always sub-
critical, that is, when P˜ changes from a saddle into a sink, then,
generically, a limit cycle Γ arises, surrounding P˜. In such a
case (see, e.g., Guckenheimer and Holmes, 1997) the euclidean
space E3Q pointed at every Q ∈ Γ can be seen as generated by
three directions: l1, tangent in Q to Γ; l2, corresponding to the
contracting direction of a suitable Poincaré return map in Q;
l3, corresponding to the expanding direction of the same map.
Then the two-dimensional manifold which at any Q ∈ Γ is tan-
gent to the plane generated by l1 and l2 constitutes (part of) the
boundary of the basin of attraction of P˜. Fig. 2 illustrates, by
a numerical example, the basin of attraction (exhibiting a conic
shape) of the sink P˜ surrounded by a limit cycle. Fig. 3 shows
two trajectories belonging to the basin of P˜ and two trajectories
reaching in a finite time the side E = 0 of the box B (the param-
eter values are the same as in Fig. 2). The next Fig. 4 shows the
basin of the sink P˜ when the limit cycle is no more contained
in B (as it may cross the plane N = 0). Finally Fig. 5 suggests
that, when P˜ becomes a saddle with a one-dimensional stable
manifold, then all the trajectories in B−
{
P˜
}
, except two, leave
the box within a finite time.
It is worth to stress that in the context p > q (i.e. the con-
tribution to environmental depletion of the I-sector, per unit of
product, is lower than that of the E-sector), when the stationary
state P˜ is a sink, the dynamics is path-dependent, as at least two
regimes (generically) occur, depending on the initial conditions
of the dynamics in the box B. In particular:
1. There exist initial conditions of the variables K N, E
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E
Fig. 2. Case p > q: l = m = 1, p = 1.2, q = 0.4, α = 0.15,N = 4, E = 3.24.
Basin of the sink P˜ = (3.2, 0.8, 1) surrounded by a limit cycle.
from which the trajectories reach in a finite time the sides
{E = 0} ∪ {N = 0} of the box and therefore we expect the
economy to get specialized in the I-sector.
2. There exist also trajectories tending asymptotically to the
stationary state P˜ where both sectors coexist (such tra-
jectories fill an open region, which may exhibit a conic
shape, see Fig. 2).
The context p > q “favours”the coexistence of the two sec-
tors, since (see Section 3), when p > q holds, an increase in
the share of workers employed in the I-sector reduces the over-
all negative impact of economic activity on the environmen-
tal resource. The consequent increase in the stock E causes
an increase of labor productivity in the E-sector and, therefore,
stimulates workers to work in such a sector. According to this
mechanism, an initial increase in the number N − N of workers
employed in the I-sector exerts an upward pressure on N, which
may counterbalance the initial increase in N − N. Such process
is obviously stabilizing. However, as underlined above, also
in this coexistence-favouring context the economy may follow
trajectories leading towards a specialization in industrial pro-
duction.
5. Welfare analysis
In this Section, we analyze welfare properties of the possi-
ble limit points of the dynamic system (5). Remember that all
the trajectories reaching in a finite time the boundary E = 0 of
the box B cannot get back into the box, since ·E < 0 always
holds for E = 0. Taking into account the non negativity con-
straint E ≥ 0, we can imagine that, when E = 0, the condition
·
E < 0 might be replaced by
·
E = 0, so that a dynamics may
take place on the side E = 0. Such a fact can be modelled by
introducing a discontinuity in the vector field (see, for exam-
ple, Utkin, 1978). It follows, as it is easily checked, that all the
0 1
2 3
4
0
2
4
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
KN
E
P˜
Fig. 3. Case p > q: l = m = 1, p = 1.2, q = 0.4, α = 0.15,N = 4, E = 3.24.
Two trajectories approaching the sink P˜ = (3.2, 0.8, 1) and two trajectories
reaching in a finite time the side E = 0 of the box B.
0
0.5
1
00.2
0.40.6
0.81
0
0.5
1
1.5
KN
E
P˜
Fig. 4. Case p > q: l = m = 1, p = 0.6, q = 0.4, α = 0.15,N = 1, E = 1.58.
Basin of the sink P˜ = (0.1, 0.9, 1) without limit cycle.
trajectories reaching in a finite time the side E = 0 approach
the boundary point P = (K,N, E) =
(
N, 0, 0
)
, where physical
capital accumulation reaches its maximum possible value (at
a stationary state) and the E-sector disappears from the econ-
omy. We will evaluate entrepreneurs and workers’ revenues at
the points
P˜ = (K,N, E) =
(
N − N˜, N˜, 1
)
, with N > N˜ > 0 (coexis-
tence of the two sectors)
P̂ = (K,N, E) =
(
0,N, Ê
)
, with Ê > 0 (specialization in
the E-sector)
P = (K,N, E) =
(
N, 0, 0
)
(specialization in the I-sector)
We will use as benchmark the revenues evaluated at the state
P̂, which is a possible limit point of the dynamics (5), but also
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Fig. 5. Case p > q: l = m = 1, p = 2, q = 1, α = 0.5,N = 4, E = 5.8.
P˜ = (3.2, 0.8, 1) is a saddle with a one-dimensional stable manifold. Almost all
the trajectories leave the box B.
corresponds to the stationary state E = Ê that the economy
would reach in absence of the I-sector, according to Eq.(8). If
workers’ revenues in P̂ are higher than in P˜ or in P, then the
stationary states P˜ and P represent contexts in which the struc-
tural change observed after the introduction of the I-sector is
welfare reducing (from the point of view of workers).
Per capita revenues of workers evaluated at P̂, RP̂w , are de-
termined by the value of E at P̂, that is
RP̂w = Ê = E − pN
Let us now compare RP̂w with per capita revenues of workers
evaluated at the stationary states P˜ and P, belonging to the iso-
cline K˙ = 0 (along which K = N − N holds). Workers’ rev-
enues are given by (N − N)α−1K1−α (at P˜, workers’ revenues
in the two sectors are the same, since the equilibrium condi-
tion (N − N)α−1K1−α = E holds). Posing K = N − N in
(N − N)α−1K1−α, we obtain that workers’ revenues at P˜ and
P, respectively RP˜w and R
P
w, are R
P˜
w = R
P
w = 1. We have that
RP̂w < R
P˜
w = R
P
w = 1 holds if Ê = E − pN < 1, that is
p >
E − 1
N
(9)
Condition (9) is satisfied if the stock E of the environmental
resource at the point P̂ is lower than 1, the value assumed by E
at the stationary state P˜, and therefore the revenues of workers
employed in the E-sector are higher in P˜ than in P̂.
It is easy to check that, when (9) holds, a necessary con-
dition for the existence of the internal stationary state P˜ =(
N − N˜, N˜, 1
)
is q <
(
E − 1
)
/N. This implies that, when P˜
exists, then workers’ revenues in P˜ can be higher than in P̂ only
in the context p > q; that is, if the contribution to environmental
depletion, per unit of product, of the E-sector is higher than that
of the I-sector. So, according to the above result and to stabil-
ity analysis of Section 3, the stationary state P˜ can be attractive
only if the structural change observed when the economy leaves
the stationary state P̂ and reaches P˜ (where the traditional and
the industrial sector coexist) generates an increase in revenues
of workers, otherwise P˜ is a saddle or a source. Differently
from the stationary state P˜, the state P = (K,N, E) =
(
N, 0, 0
)
is always attractive for the trajectories belonging to an open re-
gion of the box B, even if the inequality (9) is reversed (that is,
if workers’ revenues in P are lower than in P̂).
Finally, notice that entrepreneurs’ revenues, evaluated along
the isocline K˙ = 0, are proportional to
K1−α(N − N)α = K1−αKα = K
This implies that their revenues in P are higher than in P˜ (and,
obviously, higher than in P̂, where K = 0). So, if condi-
tion (9) holds, then entrepreneurs and workers’ revenues in P˜
(coexistence of the two sectors) and P (specialization in the I-
sector) are higher than in P̂ (specialization in the E-sector) and
P Pareto-dominates P˜ and P̂. If inequality (9) is reversed (in
this case, the point P˜ cannot be attractive), then workers’ rev-
enues in P̂ are higher than in P, while the opposite holds for
entrepreneurs’ revenues.
6. Conclusions
The economic and ecological dynamics we analyzed takes
place in a three-dimensional box B = (0,N)2 × (0, E) of the
plane (K,N, E), where K is the capital stock, N the number of
workers employed in the E-sector, E the stock of the environ-
mental resource. The main results we reached, through local
and global analysis techniques, can be summarized as follows.
1. One (and only one) stationary state P˜ = (K,N, E) =(
N − N˜, N˜, 1
)
∈ B exists if and only if the carrying ca-
pacity E of the environmental resource lies in an inter-
val whose extremes are determined by the size N of the
population of workers and by the contribution to the en-
vironmental depletion, per unit of product, of the tradi-
tional and the industrial sector, measured respectively by
the parameters p and q (that is 1 + min
(
pN, qN
)
< E <
1 + max
(
pN, qN
)
). In P˜, both sectors of the economy
coexist.
2. The stability properties of the stationary state P˜ depend
on whether the contribution to environmental depletion,
per unit of product, is higher in the I-sector (in which
case the stationary state is either a saddle with a two-
dimensional stable manifold or a repeller), or in the E-
sector (in which case the stationary state is either an at-
tractor or a saddle with a one-dimensional stable mani-
fold).
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3. In case p < q (the contribution to environmental de-
pletion is higher in the I-sector), we proved the possi-
ble existence of three regimes, depending on the initial
conditions of the dynamics in the box B. Precisely: (a)
there exist initial conditions of the economy (i.e. of the
variables K,N, E), belonging to an open subset of the
box B, from which the trajectories reach in a finite time
the side E = 0 of the box B (that is, the ecological-
economic dynamics leads to total depletion of the envi-
ronmental resources); (b) there exists an open connected
subset of the box B whose trajectories tend, as t → +∞,
to the boundary point P̂ = (K,N, E) =
(
0,N, Ê
)
, where
Ê = E − pN and the I-sector disappears (K = 0); (c)
there exist initial conditions of the variables K,N, E, be-
longing to an open subset of the box B, from which the
trajectories converge to the specialized stationary state
P2 = (K,N, E) =
(
N, 0, E2
)
, with 0 < E2 < 1. If
2 > 1 + qN > E > 1 + pN holds, then all the regimes (a),
(b) and (c) are simultaneously present.
4. In case p > q (the contribution to environmental deple-
tion is higher in the E-sector), two regimes can be ob-
served: there exist initial conditions of the economy, be-
longing to an open subset of the box B, from which the
trajectories reach in a finite time the side E = 0 of the
box B (regime (a), in point 3); furthermore, there exist
trajectories in the box B tending (asymptotically) to the
stationary state P˜, where both sectors coexist, and such
trajectories fill an open region if P˜ is attracting. The co-
existence of the two sectors of the economy, in an attrac-
tive stationary state, is possible only in this context (i.e.,
if p > q).
The limit boundary point P̂ = (K,N, E) =
(
0,N, Ê
)
, where
Ê = E− pN (see point 3), corresponds to the unique (attractive)
stationary state E = Ê of the one-sector dynamics (with K = 0
and N = N ), described by the Eq.(8), that would be observed
in absence of the I-sector. The trajectories reaching in a finite
time the side E = 0 of the box B (see the above points 3 and 4)
approach eventually the point P = (K,N, E) =
(
N, 0, 0
)
, where
the economy gets specialized in the I-sector.
Welfare analysis showed that:
(i) If p >
(
E − 1
)
/N (i.e. if condition (9) is satisfied),
then workers’ revenues in P̂ are lower than in P˜ and
P, vice-versa if p <
(
E − 1
)
/N. Under the assump-
tion p >
(
E − 1
)
/N, the stationary state P˜ exists only
if q <
(
E − 1
)
/N, and therefore p > q. This implies that
the stationary state P˜, where both sectors coexist, can be
attractive only if workers’ revenues in P˜ are higher than
in P̂ (see the above point 4). Differently from the station-
ary state P˜, the state P is always attractive for the trajec-
tories belonging to an open region of the box B even if
p <
(
E − 1
)
/N (i.e. if worker’ revenues in P are lower
than in P̂).
(ii) Entrepreneurs’ revenues, evaluated at the possible limit
points, are positively proportional to capital accumula-
tion K, and then their revenues in P are higher than in P˜
(and, obviously, higher that in P̂, where K = 0).
According to points (i) and (ii), if condition (9) holds, then
entrepreneurs and workers’ revenues in P˜ (coexistence of the
two sectors) and P (specialization in the I-sector) are higher
than in P̂ (specialization in the E-sector). Furthermore, P
Pareto-dominates both P˜ and P̂. If the reverse of condition (9)
holds (remember that, in this case, the point P˜ cannot be attrac-
tive), then workers’ revenues in P̂ are higher than in P, while
the opposite holds for entrepreneurs’ revenues. In this zero-sum
game scenario, the structural change driving the economy to-
wards P (where a complete specialization in the I-sector takes
place) is welfare reducing for workers and welfare increasing
for entrepreneurs.
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GREEN LICENSES AND ENVIRONMENTAL CORRUPTION:
A RANDOMMATCHING MODEL
Abstract
This paper studies environmental corruption via a random matching evolutionary game between a population of firms and a popu-
lation of bureaucrats in order to release a “green” license. A firm obtains the license if the bureaucrat checks that it complies with
environmental regulations, otherwise it is sanctioned. In this model there are two types of bureaucrats (honest and dishonest), two
types of firms (compliant and not compliant), and two types of crimes (corruption and extortion). Corruption is when a dishonest
bureaucrat accepts a bribe from a not compliant firm, while extortion is when a dishonest bureaucrat extorts a bribe from a compli-
ant firm. When there is no dominance of strategies, we obtain two bistable regimes, in which two attractive stationary states exist,
and two regimes with an internal stable equilibrium, which corresponds to the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the one-shot
static game, surrounded by closed trajectories. Moreover, from the comparative statics of the last two dynamic regimes emerges
that policy instruments can help the Public Administration to reduce both corruption and extortion, though increasing sanctions,
probability of being sanctioned and inspection effort do not always get the desired results.
JEL classification: C73, D21, D73, K42, Q52.
Keywords: bureaucratic corruption, evolutionary game, environmental regulations, economics of crime.
1. Introduction
Recently, the media have focused a lot of attention on com-
pliance with environmental regulations by industrial enterprises
and on inspection by bureaucrats after the so called Volkswagen
scandal1. However, the attention of economists on these issues
is not new. Several studies have analysed the negative effects
1In September 2015, the German automaker Volkswagen Group has
received a notice of violation of the Clean Air Act from the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). It was found that the enterprise had
used a software applied to some diesel engines to activate certain emissions
controls only during laboratory emissions testing. The software caused the
compliance with U.S. environmental standards for nitrogen oxide (NOx)
output during laboratory tests, but produce up to 40 times higher NOx output
in real-world driving. See, for further details, both links:
http://www.ft.com/intl/vw-emissions-scandal;
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/business/
international/vw-diesel-emissions-scandal-explained.html?
_r=0.
of corruption on environmental policy and on environmental
degradation. The first strand has examined the effects of bu-
reaucracy and lobbying groups on environmental policy (Lopez
and Mitra, 2000; Damania et al., 2003; Fredriksson et al., 2003;
Fredriksson and Svensson, 2003; Cole et al., 2006). The sec-
ond strand, instead, has investigated the effects of corruption on
the shape of the Environmental Kuznets Curve2 (Welsch, 2004;
Cole, 2007; Leitao, 2010).
Generally, not only in the specific case of environmental
corruption, bribery is considered as an evil, particularly for eco-
nomic development3, and, not surprisingly, the most corrupt
2The EKC is an inverted U-shape relationship between environmental
degradation and income. This means that environmental degradation increases
at early stages of economic development and decreases when income exceeds a
certain level. For further details, see Grossman and Krueger (1991), Shafik and
Bandyopadhyay (1992), Panayotou (1993), and Borghesi (2001). The name
was coined due to its similarity to the work of Kuznets (1955).
3Although some authors argue that bribes may lead firms to allocate their
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countries have low income level (Svensson, 2005). This link
is usually explained by the literature via the role of institutions,
since corruption is considered as an example of bad institutions
(Lipset, 1960; Demsetz, 1967; Treisman, 2000; Glaeser et al.,
2004; Acemoglu et al., 2012).
In game theory4 corruption, and crime deterrence in gen-
eral, is modelled as a strategic interaction between at least two
players. An example of this kind of models5 are the inspection
games, where one player, a policemen, must decide whether
to inspect the other player, who in turn must decide whether
to infringe a regulation (Tsebelis, 1989, 1990). According to
Holler (1993), the inspection games have no Nash equilibrium
in pure strategies since both players have the possibility to im-
prove their payoff values by choosing an alternative strategy,
given the strategy of the other player. Therefore, there is a sin-
gle mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (see Nash, 1951) which
has counter-intuitive comparative statics properties (Andreozzi,
2004). In fact, these models show how increasing sanctions
and probabilities of being discovered, for the player who must
decide whether infringe a norm, have no effects on the law en-
forcement. The only way to reduce crimes is to increase the
inspection incentives for the policemen.
In this paper we adopt the framework of the inspection
games using an evolutionary context (see, e.g., Andreozzi,
2002). The evolutionary game theory supposes that large pop-
ulations of players with bounded rationality learn, imitate, and
adopt the relatively more rewarding strategies. We believe, ac-
cording to Cressman et al. (1998), that this context seems par-
ticularly appealing for the study of crime, where, for example,
the influence of good role models in society is often stressed as
an important factor for reducing crime.
We propose a random-matching evolutionary game between
a population of firms and a population of bureaucrats6. In each
instant of time, there is a large number of random pairwise en-
counters between firms and bureaucrats. In each encounter a
bureaucrat checks the compliance with environmental regula-
tions by a firm. When the environmental laws are respected,
the firm obtains a “green” license, like a sticker. Otherwise, the
firm receives a penalty. There are two kinds of firms, compli-
ant and not compliant, and two kinds of bureaucrats, honest and
dishonest. Moreover, we suppose the existence of two crimes:
corruption and extortion. Corruption is when a dishonest bu-
resources more efficiently, in an economy afflicted by slow bureaucracy and
rigid laws (see, e.g., Leff, 1964; Huntington, 1968).
4A not game theoretic approach to study crime deterrence is the decision
theory that involves only one actor (see, for further details, Becker, 1968;
Garoupa, 1997; Polinsky and Shavell, 2000). We do not adopt this approach
since corruption is an agreement between at least two actors: a player that de-
cides to infringe a regulation and, for not being sanctioned, offers a bribe to
another player who, at same time, accepts the bribe and decides to not sanction
the other player.
5Another way to model corruption adopting a game theoretic framework
is the principal-agent theory, where the crime occurs due to the asymmetry
between the principal, usually the Public Administration, and the agent, a public
official (see, for further details, Bardhan, 1997; Di Gioacchino and Franzini,
2008). We do not use this setting since in our model the analysis is focused on
the encounters, and not in the asymmetry, between players.
6Differently from other evolutionary models on corruption, as in Antoci and
Sacco (1995, 2002), that study the dynamics of only one population.
reaucrat accepts a bribe from a not compliant firm, while ex-
tortion is when a dishonest bureaucrat extorts a bribe from a
compliant firm. Finally, we introduce the existence of an anti-
corruption agency that monitors the behaviour of bureaucrats
and firms.
When there is no dominance of strategies, we obtain four
dynamic regimes, two are bistable and two with an internal
stable equilibrium. In the first two dynamic regimes, similar
economies (same rules, same sanctions, etc.) can converge to
different stationary states, it depends on the initial shares of the
strategies in the two populations. In the other two dynamic
regimes, instead, the shares of the two populations oscillate
around an internal stable equilibrium. This implies that sim-
ilar economies can lie on different trajectories and, therefore,
can have different long-run behaviours.
The analysis of comparative statics of the dynamic regimes
with an internal stable equilibrium shows that policy instru-
ments (sanctions, probability of being discovered by the anti-
corruption agency and inspection effort) can reduce both cor-
ruption and extortion. The effectiveness of policy instruments
depends on initial shares of strategies in the two populations
and if adopting a strategy represents an evolutionary advantage.
The wealth of dynamics and the results of comparative stat-
ics make our model different from other inspection games both
static and evolutionary. In fact, our game has Nash equilibria
both in pure and in mixed strategies. The inspection games, in-
stead, as described above, have a single mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium, and, therefore, only dynamic regimes with oscil-
lating trajectories. Moreover, with regard to the properties of
comparative statics, in our model also sanctions and probability
of being discovered can reduce crimes, not only the effort of
policeman as in the inspection games.
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 describe
the model, Section 4 shows the basic results, Section 5 deals
with the dominance relationship between strategies, Section 6
analyses the dynamic regimes, Section 7 contains the effective-
ness of policy instruments, and Section 8 concludes.
2. The model
Let us assume that in each instant of time t ∈ [0,+∞), a
randomly-chosen firm plays a game with a randomly-chosen
bureaucrat. Each firm has to choose ex ante between two pos-
sible strategies: (C) to comply with environmental regulations
and to support the compliance cost CC , or (NC) not to com-
ply with environmental laws. Each bureaucrat has to choose ex
ante between two possible strategies: (H) to be honest and to
do her job properly, or (D) to be dishonest and to accept a bribe
from a not compliant firm or to claim a bribe from a compliant
firm. Tables 1 and 2 describe the firm’s and the bureaucrat’s
payoff matrix, respectively.
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Table 1
Payoffs of strategies C and NC
H D
C piHC = −CC piDC = −CC − be + θη
NC piHNC = −ps1 piDNC = −bc − θs2
If a Compliant firm encounters an Honest bureaucrat, it ob-
tains the green licence; while, if it encounters a Dishonest bu-
reaucrat it may be victim of extortion, and, therefore, the Com-
pliant firm has to pay an extortion bribe (be). However, this
crime could be discovered by the anti-corruption agency with
probability θ, in that case, the public administration will com-
pensate the extortion bribe (η). If a Not Compliant firm en-
counters an Honest bureaucrat, it will be sanctioned (s1) for
not being compliant with a probability p, that depends if the
honest bureaucrat checks well. Otherwise, if a Not Compliant
firm encounters a Dishonest bureaucrat, it will pay a corrup-
tion bribe (bc) and will take the risk of being sanctioned (s2) for
the corruption crime and for not being compliant by the anti-
corruption agency with probability θ. We suppose that CC > 0,
bc > be ≥ 0, η ≥ 0, s2 ≥ s1 > 0, 1 > θ > 0, 1 > p > 0.
Table 2
Payoffs of strategies H and D
C NC
H piCH = w pi
NC
H = w
D piCD = w + be − θσ1 piNCD = w + bc − θσ2
If a bureaucrat is Honest, she will obtain the wage (w), re-
gardless of what kind of firms she will encounter. While, if
a Dishonest bureaucrat encounters a Compliant firm, she will
obtain, in addition to wage, an extortion bribe and will take the
risk of being sanctioned (σ1) by the anti-corruption agency with
probability θ. Otherwise, if a Dishonest bureaucrat encounters
a Not Compliant firm, she will obtain, in addition to wage, the
corruption bribe and will take the risk of being sanctioned (σ2)
by the anti-corruption agency with probability θ. We suppose
that w > 0, bc > be ≥ 0, σ1 ≥ 0, σ2 > 0, 1 > θ > 0.
3. The Dynamics of the game
Let c(t) ∈ [0, 1] represent the share of firms adopting strat-
egy C and let h(t) ∈ [0, 1] represent the share of bureaucrats
adopting strategy H, at time t. Consequently, 1−c(t) and 1−h(t)
represent, respectively, the shares of firms playing strategy NC
and of bureaucrats playing strategy D.
The firms’ expected payoffs from playing strategies C and
NC are:
ΠC(h) = piHC · h + piDC · (1 − h)
ΠNC(h) = piHNC · h + piDNC · (1 − h)
where h and 1 − h represent the probabilities that a firm is
matched with a bureaucrat who plays, respectively, strategy H
or D.
The bureaucrats’ expected payoffs from playing strategies
H and D are:
ΠH(c) = piCH · c + piNCH · (1 − c)
ΠD(c) = piCD · c + piNCD · (1 − c)
where c and 1− c represent the probabilities that a bureaucrat is
matched with a firm who plays, respectively, strategy C or NC.
The average payoffs in the population of firms and of bu-
reaucrats are:
ΠF = c · ΠC(h) + (1 − c) · ΠNC(h)
ΠB = h · ΠH(c) + (1 − h) · ΠD(c)
We assume that the time evolution of c and h is described
by the standard replicator dynamics, a learning-by-imitation
model of evolution widely used in economics (see, among oth-
ers, Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1988; Bjo¨rnerstedt and Weibull,
1993; Weibull, 1997; Schlag, 1998). The replicator dynam-
ics postulates that players are bundled rational and update their
choices by adopting the relatively more rewarding behaviour
that emerges from available observations of others’ behaviours.
The shares c and h will increase (decrease) the more, the higher
(lower) their payoff differential with respect to the population
average payoff. Accordingly, in our two-strategy context the
dynamic system is:
c˙ = c[ΠC(h) − ΠF] = c(1 − c)[ΠC(h) − ΠNC(h)]
h˙ = h[ΠH(c) − ΠB] = h(1 − h)[ΠH(c) − ΠD(c)]
(1)
where c˙ and h˙ represent the time derivatives dc/dt and dh/dt
of the shares c and h, respectively. The factors c(1 − c) and
h(1 − h) are always non-negative, so the signs of c˙ and h˙ will
depend respectively on the signs of the payoff differentials.
4. Basic results
The system (1) is defined in the unit square S :
S =
{
(c, h) ∈ R2 : 0 ≤ c ≤ 1, 0 ≤ h ≤ 1
}
The graphs of the payoff differentials ΠC(h) − ΠNC(h) and
ΠH(c)−ΠD(c) are shown in Figs. 1(a) and 1(b). Strategy C (H)
is dominant when the graph of ΠC(h)−ΠNC(h) (ΠH(c)−ΠD(c))
lies entirely above the c-axis (h-axis) in the interval [0, 1]. Con-
versely, strategy NC (D) is dominant when it lies entirely below
the c-axis (h-axis) in the interval [0, 1]. Finally, if it intersects
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the interior of the interval [0, 1], then no dominant strategy ex-
ists. Figs. 1(a) and 1(b) show the possible cases that can be
observed.
The payoff differentials can be written as follows:
ΠC(h) − ΠNC(h) =
bc − be + θ (η + s2) −CC
−[bc − be + θ (η + s2) − ps1] h
(2)
ΠH(c) − ΠD(c) =
θσ2 − bc + [bc − be + θ (σ1 − σ2)] c
(3)
According to the dynamic system (1), c˙ = 0 holds if either c =
0, 1 or if the value of the share h is such that ΠC(h)−ΠNC(h) = 0,
that is:
h = h¯ :=
bc − be + θ (η + s2) −CC
bc − be + θ (η + s2) − ps1 (4)
Considering Eq. (2), we can distinguish between two cases.
Case (a):
bc − be + θ (η + s2) − ps1 < 0, that is, s1 > s¯1 (5)
where s¯1 :=
bc−be+θ (η+s2)
p .
Case (b):
bc − be + θ (η + s2) − ps1 > 0, that is, s1 < s¯1 (6)
The graph of the payoff differential ΠC(h) − ΠNC(h) is a line
with positive slope (i.e., ΠC(h) − ΠNC(h) is an increasing func-
tion of h) in Case (a), while it is a line with negative slope
(i.e., ΠC(h) −ΠNC(h) is a decreasing function of h) in Case (b).
This implies that, in the context of Case (a), the strategy C be-
comes relatively more remunerative (compared to the strategy
NC) when the share of Honest bureaucrats h increases; the op-
posite occurs in Case (b).
Analogously, according to the dynamic system (1), h˙ = 0
holds if either h = 0, 1 or if the value of the share c is such that
ΠH(c) − ΠD(c) = 0, that is:
c = c¯ :=
bc − θσ2
bc − be + θ (σ1 − σ2) (7)
Taking into account Eq. (3), we can distinguish between two
cases.
Case (c):
bc − be + θ (σ1 − σ2) > 0, that is, σ1 > σ¯1 (8)
where σ¯1 := σ2 − bc−beθ .
Case (d):
bc − be + θ (σ1 − σ2) < 0, that is, σ1 < σ¯1 (9)
The graph of the payoff differential ΠH(c) − ΠD(c) is a line
with positive slope (i.e., ΠH(c) − ΠD(c) is an increasing func-
tion of c) in Case (c), while it is a line with negative slope
(i.e., ΠH(c) − ΠD(c) is a decreasing function of c) in Case (d).
This implies that, in the context of Case (c), the strategy H be-
comes relatively more remunerative (compared to the strategy
D) when the share of Compliant firms c increases; the opposite
occurs in Case (d).
The four vertices of S , that is (c, h) = (0, 0)(1, 0)(0, 1)(1, 1),
are always stationary states of the dynamic system (1). In these
stationary states, the populations of firms and bureaucrats play
only one strategy. In (1, 1) all firms play C and all bureaucrats
play H; in (0, 0) all firms play NC and all bureaucrats play D,
and so on.
Another stationary state of the system (1) is the intersection
point (c¯, h¯) of the straight lines (4) and (7), when it belongs
to the interior of the square S , that is when 0 < c¯ < 1 and
0 < h¯ < 1. At the stationary state (c¯, h¯) all the strategies C, NC,
H and D coexist.
Finally, all the points belonging to the side of S with h = 0
(respectively, h = 1) are stationary states in the case in which
h¯ = 0 (respectively, h¯ = 1) holds. Analogously, all the points
belonging to the side of S with c = 0 (respectively, c = 1) are
stationary states if c¯ = 0 (respectively, c¯ = 1) holds.
5. Dominance relationship
In this section, we give the conditions under which a given
strategy does not dominate the alternative one, in each popula-
tion of players. Proposition 1 refers to Case (a) and Case (b),
while Proposition 2 refers to Case (c) and Case (d).
Proposition 1. In Case (a) (see (5)), ΠC(h)−ΠNC(h) is strictly
increasing in h (see Fig. 1(a)), and there is no dominance of
strategies if:
s2 < s¯2 :=
CC + be − bc
θ
− η and s1 > CCp (10)
In Case (b) (see (6)), ΠC(h)−ΠNC(h) is strictly decreasing in h
(see Fig. 1(b)), and there is no dominance of strategies if:
s2 > s¯2 and s1 <
CC
p
(11)
Proof. See Appendix. 
In Case (a), if condition (10) holds, then no strategy dom-
inates the other one, and the graph of the payoff differential
ΠC(h) − ΠNC(h) intersects the h-axis at h = h¯ ∈ (0, 1) (see (4)):
for h > h¯ (respectively, h < h¯), it holds ΠC(h) − ΠNC(h) > 0
(respectively, ΠC(h) − ΠNC(h) < 0).
On the contrary, in Case (b), if condition (11) holds, then
no strategy dominates the other one, and the graph of the payoff
differential ΠC(h)−ΠNC(h) intersects the h-axis at h = h¯ ∈ (0, 1)
(see (4)): for h > h¯ (respectively, h < h¯), it holds ΠC(h) −
ΠNC(h) < 0 (respectively, ΠC(h) − ΠNC(h) > 0).
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Fig. 1. Dominance of strategies.
Legend: line (A) dominant strategy C or H, line (B) no dominant strategy, line
(C) dominant strategy NC or D; line (D) dominant strategy C or H, line (E)
no dominant strategy, line (F) dominant strategy NC or D.
Proposition 2. In Case (c) (see (8)), ΠC(h) − ΠD(h) is strictly
increasing (see Fig. 1(a)), and there is no dominance of strate-
gies if:
σ1 >
be
θ
and σ2 <
bc
θ
(12)
In Case (d) (see (9)), ΠC(h) − ΠD(h) is strictly decreasing (see
Fig. 1(b)), and there is no dominance of strategies if:
σ1 <
be
θ
and σ2 >
bc
θ
(13)
Proof. See Appendix. 
In Case (c) if condition (12) holds, then no strategy dom-
inates the other one, and the graph of the payoff differential
ΠC(h) − ΠD(h) intersects the c-axis at c = c¯ ∈ (0, 1) (see (7)):
for c > c¯ (respectively, c < c¯), it holds ΠC(h) − ΠD(h) > 0
(respectively, ΠC(h) − ΠD(h) < 0).
On the contrary, in Case (d), if condition (13) holds, then
no strategy dominates the other one, and the graph of the payoff
differential ΠC(h) − ΠD(h) intersects the c-axis at c = c¯ ∈ (0, 1)
(see (7)): for c > c¯ (respectively, c < c¯), it holds ΠC(h) −
ΠD(h) < 0 (respectively, ΠC(h) − ΠD(h) > 0).
6. Dynamic regimes
When a dominated strategy exists, then the share of agents
adopting it decreases monotonically over time and approaches
(asymptotically) the value 0; therefore, in such a context, the
dynamics is very simple. The most interesting dynamic regimes
that may be observed correspond to the cases in which no strat-
egy dominates the other one, in each population of agents. In
such cases, the internal stationary state (c¯, h¯) exists. The follow-
ing subsections illustrate such dynamic regimes. The classifi-
cation of regimes we are going to give refers to all the possible
contexts that can occur7:
1) the context in which the parameter values satisfy the con-
ditions (5) and (8) characterizing, respectively, the Case
(a) (relatively to the population of firms) and the Case (c)
(relatively to the population of bureaucrats);
2) the context in which the parameter values satisfy the con-
ditions (6) and (9) characterizing, respectively, the Case
(b) and the Case (d);
3) the context in which the parameter values satisfy the con-
ditions (6) and (8) characterizing, respectively, the Case
(b) and the Case (c);
4) the context in which the parameter values satisfy the con-
ditions (5) and (9) characterizing, respectively, the Case
(a) and the Case (d).
The proofs of the following propositions are straightfor-
ward, since the dynamic regimes that may be observed under
replicator equations, in a context with two populations and two
strategies, have been completely classified (see Hofbauer and
Sigmund, 1988; Weibull, 1997).
6.1. Dynamic regime in the context of Cases (a) and (c)
This context is characterized by the conditions (see (5) and
(8)):
s1 >
bc − be + θ (η + s2)
p
(14)
σ1 > σ2 − bc − be
θ
(15)
7For simplicity, we do not consider the non-robust cases with s1 = s¯1 and/or
σ1 = σ¯1
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which, as shown in Section 5, imply that the payoff differentials
ΠC(h) − ΠNC(h) and ΠH(c) − ΠD(c) are strictly increasing in h
and c, respectively. Furthermore, in such a context, no domi-
nance relationship (between the two available strategies) exists,
in each population, if the following conditions are satified (see
(10) and (12)):
s2 <
CC + be − bc
θ
− η and s1 > CCp (16)
σ1 >
be
θ
and σ2 <
bc
θ
(17)
Notice that if condition (17) holds, then also condition (15)
holds. If conditions (14), (16) and (17) are satisfied, then a ”bi-
stable” dynamic regime is observed, described by the following
proposition:
Proposition 3. If conditions (14), (16) and (17) are satisfied,
then the stationary states (c, h) = (0, 0) and (c, h) = (1, 1) are
sinks (i.e., locally attractive), the stationary states (c, h) = (1, 0)
and (c, h) = (0, 1) are sources (i.e., repulsive) and the stationary
state (c, h) = (c¯, h¯), in the interior of the square S, is a saddle
point. The basins of attraction of (0, 0) and (1, 1) are separated
by the stable branch of (c¯, h¯) (see Fig. 2(a)).
In such a context, strategy C is the best reply when the share
of Honest bureaucrats is high, while strategy NC is the best
reply when the share of Honest bureaucrats is low. With regard
to bureaucrats’ behaviour, instead, strategy H is the best reply
when the share of Compliant firms is high, while strategy D
is the best reply when the share of the Compliant firms is low.
This occurs because:
• if the share of Honest bureaucrats is high, for firms is
more rewarding to adopt strategy C, since s1 and p are
relatively high, while CC is relatively low (s1 > CC/p);
• if the share of Honest bureaucrats is low, for firms is more
rewarding to adopt strategy NC, since s2, bc, θ and η are
relatively low, while CC and be are relatively high (s2 <
(CC + be − bc)/θ − η);
• if the share of Compliant firms is high, for bureaucrats is
more rewarding to adopt strategy H, since σ1 and θ are
relatively high, while be is relatively low (σ1 > be/θ);
• if the share of Compliant firms is low, for bureaucrats is
more rewarding to adopt strategy D, since σ2 and θ are
relatively low, while bc is relatively high (σ2 < bc/θ).
An economy can converge to the “vicious” stationary state
(0, 0) if both initial shares of Compliant firms and Honest bu-
reaucrats are relatively low. In point (0, 0) corruption is the
only existing crime. On the contrary, an economy can converge
to the “virtuous” stationary state (1, 1) if both initial shares of
Compliant firms and Honest bureaucrats are relatively high. In
point (1, 1) there are no crimes.
6.2. Dynamic regime in the context of Cases (b) and (d)
This context is characterized by the conditions (see (6) and
(9)):
s1 <
bc − be + θ (η + s2)
p
(18)
σ1 < σ2 − bc − be
θ
(19)
which imply that the payoff differentials ΠC(h) − ΠNC(h) and
ΠH(c) − ΠD(c) are strictly decreasing in h and c, respectively.
Furthermore, in such a context, no dominance relationship ex-
ists, in each population, if the following conditions are satified
(see (11)) and (13)):
s2 >
CC + be − bc
θ
− η and s1 < CCp (20)
σ1 <
be
θ
and σ2 >
bc
θ
(21)
Notice that if condition (21) holds, then also condition (19)
holds. If conditions (18), (20) and (21) are satisfied, the bi-
stable regime described by the following proposition occurs:
Proposition 4. If the condition (18), (20) and (21) are satisfied,
then the stationary states (c, h) = (0, 1) and (c, h) = (1, 0) are
sinks, the stationary states (c, h) = (0, 0) and (c, h) = (1, 1) are
sources and the stationary state (c, h) = (c¯, h¯), in the interior
of the square S , is a saddle point. The basins of attraction of
(0, 1) and (1, 0) are separated by the stable branch of (c¯, h¯) (see
Fig. 2(b)).
In such a context, strategy C is the best reply when the share
of Honest bureaucrats is low, while strategy NC is the best re-
ply when the share of Honest bureaucrats is high. With regard
to bureaucrats’ behaviour, instead, strategy H is the best reply
when the share of Compliant firms is low, while strategy D is
the best reply when the share of the Compliant firms is high.
This occurs because:
• if the share of Honest bureaucrats is high, for firms is
more rewarding to adopt strategy NC, since s1 and p are
relatively low, while CC is relatively high (s1 < CC/p);
• if the share of Honest bureaucrats is low, for firms is more
rewarding to adopt strategy C, since s2, bc, θ and η are
relatively high, while CC and be are relatively low (s2 >
(CC + be − bc)/θ − η);
• if the share of Compliant firms is high, for bureaucrats is
more rewarding to adopt strategy D, since σ1 and θ are
relatively low, while be is relatively high (σ1 < be/θ);
• if the share of Compliant firms is low, for bureaucrats
is more rewarding adopt strategy H, since σ2 and θ are
relatively high, while bc is relatively low (σ2 > bc/θ).
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(b) Cases (b) and (d).
Fig. 2. Path-dependent dynamics.
Legend: • attractors, ◦ repellors.
An economy can converge to the stationary state (0, 1) if the
initial share of Compliant firms is relatively low and the initial
share of Honest bureaucrats is relatively high. In point (0, 1)
there are no crimes. On the contrary, an economy can con-
verge to the stationary state (1, 0) if the initial share of Com-
pliant firms is relatively high and the initial share of Honest
bureaucrats is relatively low. In point (1, 0) extortion is the only
existing crime.
The states (c, h) = (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1), when locally
attractive, as in Proposition 3 and in Proposition 4, are Nash
equilibria. This finding follows from standard results in evolu-
tionary game theory (see, e.g., Weibull, 1997). We can inter-
pret Nash equilibria as social conventions, that is, as customary
and expected states of things in which no single individual has
an incentive to modify her choices if the others do not modify
theirs.
6.3. Dynamic regime in the context of Cases (b) and (c)
This context is characterized by the following conditions
(see (6) and (8)):
s1 <
bc − be + θ (η + s2)
p
(22)
σ1 > σ2 − bc − be
θ
(23)
which imply that the payoff differentials ΠC(h) − ΠNC(h) and
ΠH(c) − ΠD(c) are, respectively, strictly decreasing in h and
strictly increasing in c. In such a context, no dominance rela-
tionship exists, in each population, if the following conditions
are satified (see (11) and (12)):
s2 >
CC + be − bc
θ
− η and s1 < CCp (24)
σ1 >
be
θ
and σ2 <
bc
θ
(25)
Notice that if condition (25) holds, then also condition (23)
holds. The following proposition illustrates the basic proper-
ties of the dynamic regime observed if conditions (22), (24)
and (25) are satisfied:
Proposition 5. If conditions (22), (24) and (25) are satisfied,
then the stationary states (c, h) = (0, 1), (1, 0), (0, 0) and (1, 1)
are saddle points, while the internal stationary state (c, h) =
(c¯, h¯) is a (Lyapunov) stable stationary state surrounded by
closed trajectories turning counter-clockwise (see Fig. 3(a)).
In such a context, strategy C is the best reply when the share
of Honest bureaucrats is low, while strategy NC is the best re-
ply when the share of Honest bureaucrats is high. With regard
to bureaucrats’ behaviour, instead, strategy H is the best reply
when the share of Compliant firms is high, while strategy D
is the best reply when the share of the Compliant firms is low.
This occurs because:
• if the share of Honest bureaucrats is high, for firms is
more rewarding to adopt strategy NC, since s1 and p are
relatively low, while CC is relatively high (s1 < CC/p);
• if the share of Honest bureaucrats is low, for firms is more
rewarding to adopt strategy C, since s2, bc, θ and η are
relatively high, while CC and be are relatively low (s2 >
(CC + be − bc)/θ − η);
• if the share of Compliant firms is high, for bureaucrats is
more rewarding to adopt strategy H, since σ1 and θ are
relatively high, while be is relatively low (σ1 > be/θ);
• if the share of Compliant firms is low, for bureaucrats is
more rewarding to adopt strategy D, since σ2 and θ are
relatively low, while bc is relatively high (σ2 < bc/θ).
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This oscillatory dynamics could be explained using the
predator-prey conceptual framework, where Dishonest bureau-
crats are the predators and Not Compliant firms are the preys.
In fact, starting from an initial condition in which the share of
Not Complaint firms is high (many preys), for bureaucrats is
more rewarding to adopt strategy D (the share of predators in-
creases). However, the increase of Dishonest bureaucrats de-
creases the share of preys: the best reply for firms is to adopt
strategy C. Few preys decreases the share of predators, since
the best reply for bureaucrats is to adopt strategy H if the share
of Compliant firms is high. A less share of predators allows the
proliferation of the preys: for firms is more rewarding to adopt
strategy NC if the share of Honest bureaucrats is high. And so
on.
6.4. Dynamic regime in the context of Cases (a) and (d)
This context is characterized by the following conditions
(see (5) and (9)):
s1 >
bc − be + θ (η + s2)
p
(26)
σ1 < σ2 − bc − be
θ
(27)
which imply that the payoff differentials ΠC(h) − ΠNC(h) and
ΠH(c) − ΠD(c) are, respectively, strictly increasing in h and
strictly decreasing in c. Furthermore, in such a context, no dom-
inance relationship exists, in each population, if the following
conditions are satified (see (10) and (13)):
s2 <
CC + be − bc
θ
− η and s1 > CCp (28)
σ1 <
be
θ
and σ2 >
bc
θ
(29)
Notice that if condition (29) holds, then also condition (27)
holds. The following proposition illustrates the basic proper-
ties of the dynamic regime observed if conditions (26), (28)
and (29) are satisfied:
Proposition 6. If conditions (26), (28) and (29) are satisfied,
then the stationary states (c, h) = (0, 1), (1, 0), (0, 0) and (1, 1)
are saddle points, while the internal stationary state (c, h) =
(c¯, h¯) is a (Lyapunov) stable stationary state surrounded by
closed trajectories turning clockwise (see Fig. 3(b)).
In such a context, strategy C is the best reply when the share
of Honest bureaucrats is high, while strategy NC is the best
reply when the share of Honest bureaucrats is low. With regard
to bureaucrats’ behaviour, instead, strategy H is the best reply
when the share of Compliant firms is low, while strategy D is
the best reply when the share of the Compliant firms is high.
This occurs because:
• if the share of Honest bureaucrats is high, for firms is
more rewarding to adopt strategy C, since s1 and p are
relatively high, while CC is relatively low (s1 > CC/p);
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(a) Cases (b) and (c).
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(b) Cases (a) and (d).
Fig. 3. Dynamics with a stable internal equilibrium.
Legend:  saddle points.
• if the share of Honest bureaucrats is low, for firms is more
rewarding to adopt strategy NC, since s2, bc, θ and η are
relatively low, while CC and be are relatively high (s2 <
(CC + be − bc)/θ − η);
• if the share of Compliant firms is high, for bureaucrats is
more rewarding to adopt strategy D, since σ1 and θ are
relatively low, while be is relatively high (σ1 < be/θ);
• if the share of Compliant firms is low, for bureaucrats is
more rewarding to adopt strategy H, since σ2 and θ are
relatively high , while bc is relatively low(σ2 > bc/θ).
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This oscillatory dynamics could be explained using the
predator-prey conceptual framework, where Dishonest bureau-
crats are the predators and Compliant firms are the preys. In
fact, starting from an initial condition in which the share of
Compliant firms is high (many preys), for bureaucrats is more
rewarding to adopt strategy D (the share of predators increases).
However, the increase of Dishonest bureaucrats decreases the
share of preys: the best reply for firms is to adopt strategy NC.
Few preys decreases the share of predators, since the best reply
for bureaucrats is to adopt strategy H if the share of Not Com-
pliant is high. A less share of predators allows the proliferation
of the preys: for firms is more rewarding to adopt strategy C if
the share of Honest bureaucrats is high. And so on.
The state (c, h) = (c¯, h¯), in Propositions 5 and 6, corre-
sponds to the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of the one shot
(static) game defined by the payoff matrices shown in Tables 1
and 2. Accordingly, the firm chooses the strategy C with prob-
ability c¯ and the bureaucrat chooses the strategy H with prob-
ability h¯; therefore (c¯, h¯) would represent the equilibrium if all
individuals were perfectly rational. We can also interpret (c¯, h¯)
as the time-average values of the shares of compliant firms
and honest bureaucrats, evaluated over the closed trajectories
in Figs. 3(a) and 3(b). In this sense (c¯, h¯) can estimate the be-
haviour of economic agents in random observations over long
time periods (see Weibull, 1997).
7. Comparative statics
This section studies the effects of variations in parameter
values on the coordinates of the internal equilibrium (c¯, h¯). We
focus our analysis on the two dynamic regimes where the inter-
nal equilibrium (c¯, h¯) is stable and, therefore, where the values
of c and h represent also the average values along the closed
trajectories (i.e., the context of Cases (b) and (c), and that of
Cases (a) and (d)). In the other cases, the internal equilibrium
is a saddle point and, therefore, is not stable. The following
Proposition 7 gives the general comparative statics results con-
cerning variations in the parameters of the model whose values
can be influenced by the Public Administration’s choices:
• p: probability that a honest bureaucrat check well if a
firm is compliant;
• θ: probability of being discovered by the anti-corruption
agency;
• s1: firm’s sanction for not being compliant;
• s2: firm’s sanction for corruption crime and for not being
compliant;
• σ1: bureaucrat’s sanction for extortion crime;
• σ2: bureaucrat’s sanction for corruption crime.
The symbols x ↑, x ↓, and x− mean, respectively, that the
value of x increases, decreases or remains constant, where x
may represent either c¯ or h¯, or a parameter of the model.
Proposition 7.
1) If p ↑, then c¯ − always, while h¯ ↑ if and only if (iff)
s2 > (CC + be − bc)/θ − η.
2) If θ ↑, then c¯ ↑ iff σ2be > σ1bc, while h¯ ↑ iff s1 < CC/p.
3) If s1 ↑, then c¯ − always, while h¯ ↑ iff s2 > (CC + be −
bc)/θ − η.
4) If s2 ↑, then c¯ − always, while h¯ ↑ iff s1 < CC/p.
5) If σ1 ↑, then c¯ ↑ iff σ2 > bc/θ, while h¯ − always.
6) If σ2 ↑, then c¯ ↑ iff σ1 < be/θ, while h¯ − always.
Proof. Signs of the partial derivatives of functions (4) and (7).

7.1. Comparative statics in the context of Cases (b) and (c)
When occurs Cases (b) and (c), remember that:
• The payoff differential ΠC(h) − ΠNC(h) is a decreasing
function of h, and, therefore, the more is the share of
Honest bureaucrats h, the less is the payoff of strategy
C relatively to strategy NC. This implies (as far as com-
parative statics is concerned) that, for enough low values
of h, it holds ΠC(h)−ΠNC(h) > 0 (therefore, c˙ > 0), while
the opposite occurs for enough high values of h.
• The payoff differential ΠH(c) − ΠD(c) is an increasing
function of c, and, therefore, the more is the share of
Compliant firms c, the more is the payoff of strategy H
relatively to strategy D. This imply (as far as the compar-
ative statics is concerned) that, for enough low values of
c, it holds ΠH(c) − ΠD(c) < 0 (therefore, h˙ < 0), while
the opposite occurs for enough high values of c.
In such a context, as described in Section 6, in an environ-
ment characterized by a low share of Honest bureaucrats and a
low share of Compliant firms, then C is the best reply for firms,
while D is the best reply for bureaucrats. Therefore, follow-
ing conditions (24) and (25), firms that adopt strategy C and
bureaucrats that adopt strategy D show an evolutionary advan-
tage. So, if the Public Administration decides to increase the
probabilities (p and θ) and the sanctions (s1, s2, σ1, and σ2)
due to the high shares of Not Compliant firms and Dishonest
bureaucrats, the effects will be mixed (see Table 3). In fact, an
increase in the policy parameters (p, θ, s1, s2, σ1, σ2) has the
effect of increase the share of Compliant firms (i.e., sh), but, at
same time, has the effect of decrease the share of Honest bu-
reaucrats (i.e., sc).
23
Ph.D. thesis of Gianluca Iannucci (2), 15-27
Table 3
Cases (b) and (c): monotonic relations between equilibrium shares (sc, sh) and
their parameters
c¯ h¯
p − ↑
θ ↓ ↑
s1 − ↑
s2 − ↑
σ1 ↓ −
σ2 ↓ −
Legend: ↑ Increasing, ↓ Decreasing, − Independent.
7.2. Comparative statics in the context of Cases (a) and (d)
When occurs Cases (a) and (d), remember that:
• The payoff differential ΠC(h) − ΠNC(h) is an increasing
function of h, and, therefore, the more is the share of
Honest bureaucrats h, the more is the payoff of strategy C
relatively to strategy NC. This implies (as far as compar-
ative statics is concerned) that, for enough low values of
h, it holds ΠC(h) − ΠNC(h) < 0 (therefore, c˙ < 0), while
the opposite occurs for enough high values of h.
• The payoff differential ΠH(c) − ΠD(c) is a decreasing
function of c, and, therefore, the more is the share of
Compliant firms c, the less is the payoff of strategy H
relatively to strategy D. This imply (as far as the compar-
ative statics is concerned) that, for enough low values of
c, it holds ΠH(c) − ΠD(c) > 0 (therefore, h˙ > 0), while
the opposite occurs for enough high values of c.
In such a context, as described in Section 6, in an environ-
ment characterized by a low share of Honest bureaucrats and
a low share of Compliant firms, then NC is the best reply for
firms, while H is the best reply for bureaucrats. Therefore, fol-
lowing conditions (28) and (29), firms that adopt strategy NC
and bureaucrats that adopt strategy H show an evolutionary ad-
vantage. So, if the Public Administration decides to increase
the probabilities (p and θ) and the sanctions (s1, s2, σ1, and σ2)
due to the high shares of Not Compliant firms and Dishonest
bureaucrats, the effects will be mixed (see Table 4). In fact, an
increase in the policy parameters (p, θ, s1, s2, σ1, σ2) has the
effect of increase the share of Honest bureaucrats (i.e., sc), but,
at same time, has the effect of decrease the share of Compliant
firms (i.e., sh).
Table 4
Cases (a) and (d): monotonic relations between equilibrium shares (sc, sh) and
their parameters
c¯ h¯
p − ↓
θ ↑ ↓
s1 − ↓
s2 − ↓
σ1 ↑ −
σ2 ↑ −
Legend: ↑ Increasing, ↓ Decreasing, − Independent.
8. Conclusions
This paper has investigated the environmental corruption
via a random matching evolutionary game between a popula-
tion of firms and a population of bureaucrats. In each encounter
a bureaucrat checks the compliance with environmental regu-
lations by a firm. When the environmental laws are respected,
the firm obtains a “green” license, like a sticker; otherwise, it
receives a penalty. We assume the existence of two types of
firms, Compliant and Not Compliant, two types of bureaucrats,
Honest and Dishonest, and also two types of crimes, corrup-
tion and extortion. Corruption is when a Dishonest bureaucrat
accepts a bribe from a Not Compliant firm, while extortion is
when a Dishonest bureaucrat extorts a bribe from a Compliant
firm.
From our analysis we obtain four dynamic regimes, two are
bistable, and two with an internal stable equilibrium, which cor-
responds to the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of the one-
shot static game, surrounded by closed trajectories. In the two
path-dependent regimes, the dynamics depends on the initial
conditions, i.e., the share of Compliant firms and the share of
Honest bureaucrats. In the first regime one equilibrium is “vir-
tuous”, all firms are Compliant and all bureaucrats are Honest,
while the other is “vicious”, all firms are Not Compliant and
all bureaucrats are Dishonest. In the second regime, instead, in
one equilibrium all firms are Compliant and all bureaucrats are
Dishonest, while in the other all firms are Not Compliant and
all bureaucrats are Honest.
With regard to the two regimes with an internal stable equi-
librium that is surrounded by closed trajectories, in one the
trajectories turn counter-clockwise, while in the other the tra-
jectories turn clockwise. These oscillatory dynamics could
be explained using the predator-prey conceptual framework.
When the trajectories oscillate counter-clockwise, Honest bu-
reaucrats are the predators, while Not Compliant are the preys.
Otherwise, when the trajectories oscillate clockwise, Dishon-
est bureaucrats are the predators and Compliant firms are the
preys. From comparative statics of these two dynamic regimes
emerges that policy instruments can help the Public Adminis-
tration to reduce both corruption and extortion. However, in
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an environment characterized by high shares of Not Compliant
firms and Dishonest bureaucrats, an increase of policy param-
eters has positive effects on crime deterrence only if adopting
strategies C and H represents an evolutionary advantage.
In the regime with trajectories that turn counter-clockwise,
firms that adopt strategy Compliant and bureaucrats that adopt
strategy Dishonest have an evolutionary advantage, in an envi-
ronment characterized by high shares of Not Compliant firms
and Dishonest bureaucrats. Therefore, all policy instruments
increase the share of Compliant firms, but decrease the share of
Dishonest bureaucrats. Conversely, in the regime with trajecto-
ries that turn clockwise, firms that adopt strategy Not Compliant
and bureaucrats that adopt strategy Honest have an evolution-
ary advantage, in an environment characterized by high shares
of Not Compliant firms and Dishonest bureaucrats. Therefore,
all policy instruments increase the share of Honest bureaucrats,
but decrease the share of Compliant firms.
The model can be extended and adapted to the different con-
cepts of corruption in literature, as well as to future researches.
For instance, it would be interesting to consider the possibility
that the compliant firm could denounce the dishonest bureau-
crat who claims a bribe. This possibility, since it complicates
the actual model, could be the topic of a future model.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
1) In Case (a) (see (5)), ΠC(h)−ΠNC(h) is strictly increasing
in h (see Fig. 1(a)) and the following sub-cases can occur:
i) If:
ΠC(0) − ΠNC(0) =
= bc − be + θ (η + s2) −CC ≥ 0
that is, if:
s2 ≥ s¯2 := Cc + be − bc
θ
− η (30)
then ΠC(h) − ΠNC(h) > 0 holds for every h ∈ (0, 1)
and, consequently, the strategy C dominates the strat-
egy NC.
ii) If:
ΠC(1) − ΠNC(1) = ps1 −CC ≤ 0
that is, if:
s1 ≤ CCp (31)
then ΠC(h) − ΠNC(h) < 0 holds for every h ∈ (0, 1)
and, consequently, the strategy NC dominates the
strategy C.
iii) If neither condition (30) nor (31) hold, that is if:
s2 < s¯2 and s1 >
CC
p
(32)
then no strategy dominates the other one, and the
graph of the payoff differential ΠC(h) − ΠNC(h) in-
tersects the h-axis at h = h¯ ∈ (0, 1) (see (4)): for h >
h¯ (respectively, h < h¯), it holds ΠC(h)−ΠNC(h) > 0
(respectively, ΠC(h) − ΠNC(h) < 0).
2) In Case (b) (see (6)), ΠC(h)−ΠNC(h) is strictly decreasing
in h (see Fig. 1(b)) and the following sub-cases can be
observed:
i) If:
ΠC(0) − ΠNC(0) =
= bc − be + θ (η + s2) −CC ≤ 0
that is, if:
s2 ≤ s¯2 (33)
then ΠC(h) − ΠNC(h) < 0 holds for every h ∈ (0, 1)
and, therefore, the strategy NC dominates the strat-
egy C.
ii) If:
ΠC(1) − ΠNC(1) = ps1 −CC ≥ 0
that is, if:
s1 ≥ CCp (34)
then ΠC(h) − ΠNC(h) > 0 holds for every h ∈ (0, 1)
and, therefore, the strategy C dominates the strategy
NC.
iii) If neither condition (33) nor condition (34) hold,
that is, if:
s2 > s¯2 and s1 <
CC
p
(35)
then no strategy dominates the other one, and the
graph of the payoff differential ΠC(h) − ΠNC(h) in-
tersects the h-axis at h = h¯ ∈ (0, 1) (see (4)): for h >
h¯ (respectively, h < h¯), it holds ΠC(h)−ΠNC(h) < 0
(respectively, ΠC(h) − ΠNC(h) > 0).
Proof of Proposition 2
1) In Case (c) (see (8)), ΠH(c) − ΠD(c) is strictly increasing
(see Fig. 1(a)) and the following sub-cases can occur:
i) If:
ΠH(0) − ΠD(0) = θσ2 − bc ≥ 0
that is, if:
σ2 ≥ bc
θ
(36)
then ΠH(c) − ΠD(c) > 0 holds for every c ∈ (0, 1)
and, consequently, the strategy H dominates the strat-
egy D.
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ii) If:
ΠH(1) − ΠD(1) = −be + θσ1 ≤ 0
that is, if:
σ1 ≤ be
θ
(37)
then ΠH(c) − ΠD(c) < 0 holds for every c ∈ (0, 1)
and, consequently, the strategy D dominates the strat-
egy H.
iii) If neither condition (36) nor condition (37) hold,
that is if:
σ1 >
be
θ
and σ2 <
bc
θ
(38)
then no strategy dominates the other one, and the
graph of the payoff differential ΠH(c)−ΠD(c) inter-
sects the c-axis at c = c¯ ∈ (0, 1) (see (7)): for c > c¯
(respectively, c < c¯), it holds ΠH(c) − ΠD(c) > 0
(respectively, ΠH(c) − ΠD(c) < 0).
2) In Case (d) (see (9)), ΠH(c) − ΠD(c) is strictly decreas-
ing (see Fig. 1(b)) and the following sub-cases can be
observed:
i) If:
ΠH(0) − ΠD(0) = θσ2 − bc ≤ 0
that is, if:
σ2 ≤ bc
θ
(39)
then ΠH(c) − ΠD(c) < 0 holds for every c ∈ (0, 1)
and, therefore, the strategy D dominates the strat-
egy H.
ii) If:
ΠH(1) − ΠD(1) = −be + θσ1 ≥ 0
that is, if:
σ1 ≥ be
θ
(40)
then ΠH(c) − ΠD(c) > 0 holds for every c ∈ (0, 1)
and, therefore, the strategy H dominates the strat-
egy D.
iii) If neither condition (39) nor condition (40) hold,
that is, if:
σ1 <
be
θ
and σ2 >
bc
θ
(41)
then no strategy dominates the other one, and the
graph of the payoff differential ΠH(c)−ΠD(c) inter-
sects the c-axis at c = c¯ ∈ (0, 1) (see (7)): for c > c¯
(respectively, c < c¯), it holds ΠH(c) − ΠD(c) < 0
(respectively, ΠH(c) − ΠD(c) > 0).
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XXVIII cycle
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS, LAND RENT,
AND POLLUTION IN A LOCAL ECONOMY
Abstract
This paper studies the possible effects of foreign direct investments in land on the development of a local economy. To this aim, we
use a two-sector model (external and local) with heterogeneous agents: external investors and local land owners. The dynamics
is given by the accumulation of pollution and local physical capital, while the external physical capital accumulation is driven by
foreign direct investments. We assume that both sectors are negatively affected by pollution, but only the external sector is polluting.
The local government can tax its production activities to finance environmental defensive expenditures. We compute local agents
revenues via numerical simulations analysis. A welfare-improving growth path may occur only if the pollution tax is high enough
and the impact of the external sector on pollution is low enough, since the revenues of local land owners depend inversely on
pollution level. Otherwise, a welfare-reducing growth path may occur, and foreign direct investments decrease the revenues of local
land owners.
JEL classification: D62, F21, O15, O41, Q50.
Keywords: two-sector model, land grabbing, environmental negative externalities, pollution.
1. Introduction
In the last 10 years there was a significant increase of stud-
ies on foreign direct investments (FDI) in land, a phenomenon
often referred to land grabbing1. Some authors consider this
phenomenon as an opportunity to improve local physical capital
for agricultural production, while others highlight the negative
long-term implications for food security (Arezki et al., 2015).
The land rented to foreign investors is used mainly to pro-
duce two agricultural goods, food and bio-fuel. In the first case,
the land grabbing is an outsourcing of domestic food production
of those countries in which there are a limited availability of
water and arable land, such as the Gulf States (Zoomers, 2010).
With regard to bio-fuel production, instead, the biggest play-
ers are high-income OECD countries and emerging economies,
1By this term, we refer the FDI in land acquisition to produce agricultural
goods in developing countries (Saturnino et al., 2011).
which include some important bio-fuel producers, such as
China and South Korea (Cotula et al., 2009). In a recent arti-
cle on FDI for bio-fuel in Sub-Saharan Africa, Giovannetti and
Ticci (2016) have shown that capital is attracted by water abun-
dance, weak institutional framework and ill-defined land prop-
erty rights. Indeed, the investments in this activity need water,
political stability of the local government, and countries where
individual land rights do not represent a guarantee against large-
scale acquisition.
The debate on the effects of “land grabbing” in develop-
ing countries is part of the general debate on the effects of FDI
on economic development and on environmental degradation.
Some authors emphasize the positive role played by FDI on
economic development, while others are more critical. Au-
thors emphasizing the “pros” highlight positive effects of FDI
on physical capital accumulation in the host economy due to the
introduction of innovative technologies and inputs (Borensztein
et al., 1998, Kemeny, 2010; Cipollina et al., 2012), of knowl-
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edge and skills through labour and manager training (Liu et al.,
2001; Hansen and Rand, 2006), and of industrial competition
by overcoming entry barriers and reducing the market power
of exiting firms (Chung, 2001; Bitzer and Görg, 2009; Nicol-
ini and Resmini, 2010; Damijan et al., 2013). On the contrary,
some authors stress the negative effects on the development of
the local economy generated by FDI via the crowding out of
local firms (Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Agosin and Machado,
2005; Herzer et al., 2008; Waldkirch and Ofosu, 2010).
There is also no agreement in empirical literature on the ef-
fects of FDI on environmental degradation, despite the increas-
ing number of studies mainly on a special case of the Environ-
mental Kuznets Curve2 (see for a survey of the literature, Dinda,
2004; Kijima et al., 2010; Pasten et al., 2012), i.e., the so called
pollution haven hypothesis. The basic idea is that the polluting
firms from developed countries relocate part of their production
activities in developing countries, where the environmental reg-
ulations are less stringent (Grether and De Melo, 2003). There-
fore, some authors argue that the more lenient environmental
standards attract polluted FDI (see, e.g., Cole, 2004; He, 2006;
Cole and Fredriksson, 2009). However, other economists argue
that there is no relationship between FDI and environmental
regulations (see, e.g., Millimet and List, 2004; Levinson and
Taylor, 2008).
The debate so far has focused on empirical controversies
and the modelling of the land grabbing phenomenon has been,
to our knowledge, very limited. This paper proposes a two-
sector model (an external and a local sector) with heteroge-
neous agents (external investors and local land owners) to anal-
yse the effects of FDI in land acquisition on economic develop-
ment and environmental degradation. It investigates the dynam-
ics characterizing a small open economy, in which both sectors
are negatively affected by pollution level. Both sectors produce
agricultural goods and use as inputs the land endowment of the
host economy and the physical capital. We exclude the labour
input in both sectors, assuming that each local agent inelasti-
cally employs a unit of her labour in the local production pro-
cess, as well as each external agent in the external production
process. Consider, for instance, several developing countries
in which land and physical capital are scant factors, while un-
skilled labour is relatively abundant.
In such a context, the local land owner can rent her land to
the external investors or use it to the local production process.
The rent price is set by the land rental market and we assume,
for simplicity, instantaneous adjustments. We suppose that only
the external sector has negative effects on pollution level, and,
for this reason, we introduce the possibility for the local govern-
ment to tax its production activity. The revenues coming from
the pollution tax are used to finance environmental defensive
expenditures. Our model differs from other similar frameworks
proposed by López (2010) and Antoci et al. (2014, 2015a,b)
who adopt two-sector models with environmental externalities
and heterogeneous agents. In our model, we study two agricul-
tural sectors, analysing the allocation of land endowment and
2The name was coined by Panayotou (1993) due to its similarity to the work
of Kuznets (1955)
the welfare of local land owners, and the environmental degra-
dation is treated as pollution level. Otherwise, López (2010)
and Antoci et al. (2014, 2015a,b) study an industrial sector and
a resource-dependent sector, analysing the allocation of labour
endowment and the welfare of local workers, and the environ-
mental degradation is the depletion of natural resources. More-
over, in López (2010) and Antoci et al. (2014, 2015a,b) the local
agents can defend themselves from environmental degradation
only via working for the polluting sector. In our model, instead,
in addition to rent their land to the polluting sector, also the
government can defend local agents from environmental degra-
dation via using the pollution tax.
Numerical simulations show that the dynamics may be bi-
stable: there are two locally attractive stationary states, one in
which the economy is specialized in the local sector and one in
which there is coexistence of the external and the local sector,
and the basins of attraction of the two attractive stationary states
are separated by the stable branch of a saddle point. Moreover,
the dynamics with or without specialization in the local sector
is determined by the parameter values of the pollution tax and
the impact of the external sector on pollution level, with respect
to each other.
With regard to welfare analysis of local agents, it emerges
that the revenues of land owners may be greater at stationary
state in which the economy is specialized in the local sector
than at stationary state in which there is coexistence between
sectors. However, a welfare-improving growth path may occur
if the pollution tax is high enough and the impact of the exter-
nal sector on pollution is low enough, respectively. This occurs
because the revenues of local agents depend inversely on pollu-
tion level. An increase of the pollution tax and a decrease of the
impact of the external sector on pollution decrease the pollution
level, and, therefore, increase the welfare of land owners.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is presented
in Section 2. Section 3 defines the dynamics with and without
specialization, Section 4 contains some basic results about the
dynamics of the model, Section 5 illustrates, via numerical sim-
ulations, some possible dynamic regimes, Section 6 deals with
welfare analysis, and Section 7 concludes.
2. The model
Let us consider a small open economy with two production
factors (land and physical capital) and two groups of agents:
“Local land owners” (L-agents) and “External investor” (E-
agents). In this context, we will analyse the accumulation of
local physical capital and the evolution of pollution, which de-
pends on production activities. We exclude the labour input,
since we suppose that each agent inelastically employs a unit of
her labour endowment to the production process.
We assume that the production functions of the two sectors
satisfy Inada conditions, i.e., are concave, increasing and ho-
mogeneous of degree 1 in their inputs. We assume that the pop-
ulations of local and external agents are both constituted by a
continuum of identical individuals, and, therefore, we consider
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the choice processes of the representative agents. The produc-
tion function of the representative L-agent is given by:
YL = A˜KαL L
1−α (1)
where A˜ := A/(1 + aP) is a measure of productivity of the local
sector, which negatively depends on the stock of pollution P;
KL is the physical capital accumulated by the representative L-
agent; L is the land used in the local sector production; 0 < α <
1 and A, a > 0.
The L-agent’s total endowment of land is normalized to 1
and the representative Land owner allocates her land endow-
ment between the two sectors; so 1 − L represents the land that
the local agent rents to the representative External investor. The
production function of the representative External investor is
given by:
YE = B˜K
β
E(1 − L)1−β (2)
where KE denotes the stock of physical capital invested by the
representative E-agent in the economy; B˜ := B/(1 + bP) is a
measure of productivity of external sector; 0 < β < 1 and B,
b > 0. The representative E-agent chooses her land demand
1 − L and the stock of physical capital KE in order to maximize
her profits, i.e.:
max
1−L, KE
[
(1 − τ)B˜KβE(1 − L)1−β − rL(1 − L) − rK KE
]
(3)
where τ ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter that measures the environmental
taxation, rL and rK are, respectively, the land rental price and the
cost of capital3. We assume that rK is an exogenous parameter,
while rL is endogenously determined by the land rental market
equilibrium condition. We suppose that KE inflow is potentially
unlimited.
Differently, in each instant of time the representative Local
agent chooses the allocation of her land between the two sec-
tors. The maximization problem is the following:
max
L
[
A˜KαL L
1−α + rL(1 − L)
]
(4)
Furthermore, we assume that the dynamics of accumulation of
KL is described by the equation
K˙L = s
[
A˜KαL L
1−α + rL(1 − L)
]
− γKL (5)
where, K˙L is the time derivative dKL/dt of KL, s ∈ (0, 1) is
the constant saving rate, and γ > 0 represents the depreciation
of KL. To simplify, we assume that the prices of the goods
produced in the local and in the external sectors are both equal
to unity; moreover, the land rental price rL is expressed in terms
of the output of the external sector. Finally, the dynamics of
pollution is described by:
P˙ = δsYE − εP − ηD
where, P˙ is the time derivative dP/dt of P, sYE represents the
economy-wide average value of YE , δ > 0 is a parameter that
3We can consider rK as opportunity cost.
measures the impact of the external sector on pollution, ε > 0
represents the decay rate of pollution P, D are the pollution
abatement expenditures financed by taxation of external eco-
nomic activities (D = τsYE), and η > 0 is a parameter that
measures the effectiveness of pollution abatement expenditures.
Therefore, the dynamics of pollution can be rewritten as:
P˙ = (δ − ητ)sYE − εP (6)
We assume that each economic agent considers as negligible
the impact of her choices on sYE and on the time evolution of
P (that is, sYE is considered as exogenously determined). Since
E-agents are identical, the average output YE ex post coincides
with the per capita value YE .
3. Dynamics
The dynamics is obtained by solving the maximization prob-
lems (3)-(4); the solutions of these problems allow to determine
the equilibrium values of L and KE . In particular, the maxi-
mization problem of the representative L-agent determines the
following first order condition:
rL = (1 − α) A˜KαL L−α (7)
Similarly, the maximization problem of the representative E-
agent gives rise to the following first order conditions:
rL = (1 − β) (1 − τ) B˜KβE(1 − L)−β (8)
rK = β (1 − τ) B˜Kβ−1E (1 − L)1−β (9)
We assume that land rental market is perfectly competitive and
land rental prices are flexible. E- and L- agents take rL as given,
but land rental price and land allocation between the two sectors
continue to change until land rental demand is equal to land
rental supply. The land rental market equilibrium condition is
given by:
(1 − β) (1 − τ) B˜KβE(1 − L)−β = (1 − α) A˜KαL L−α (10)
From Eq. (9), we have:
KE =
( β
rK
(1 − τ) B˜
) 1
1−β (1 − L) (11)
Substituting Eq. (11) in Eq. (10), we obtain:
L = Γ
(
A˜KαL
) 1
α (12)
where:
Γ :=
[
1 − α
(1 − β)
(
B˜ (1 − τ)
) 1
1−β ( β
rK
) β
1−β
] 1
α
Function (12) identifies the land rental market equilibrium value
L˜ of L if the right side of Eq. (12) is lower than 1; otherwise,
L˜ = 1, that is:
L˜ = min
{
1, Γ (A˜KαL )
1
α
}
(13)
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Consequently, from Eq. (11), the equilibrium value K˜E of KE
is determined by:
K˜E =
( β
rK
(1 − τ) B˜
) 1
1−β (1 − L˜) (14)
The economy is specialized in the production of the L-sector if
L˜ = 1 (and, consequently, KE = 0). The graph of the function
KL := sKL = 1
Γ (A˜)
1
α
(15)
separates the region of the plane (P,KL) where L˜ = 1 (above it)
from the region where L˜ < 1 (below it) 4.
From condition (13) we can distinguish two possible cases:
(a) if KL = 0, then the economy specializes in the production of
the external sector (that is, L˜ = 0 and KE =
(
β
rK
(1−τ) B˜
) 1
1−β are
chosen); and (b) if KL > 0, instead, condition (13) excludes the
specialization in the external sector (i.e., L˜ > 0 always holds for
KL > 0). In this case, we can distinguish two sub-cases, that is:
(i) the case without specialization in the local sector (i.e., L˜ ∈
(0, 1)) and (ii) the case with specialization (i.e., L˜ = 1). When
KL > 0, the external sector never completely replaces the local
sector since the productivity of land used in the local activities
tends to infinity as L → 0. On the contrary, when KL > 0 the
economy can fully specialize in the local sector though also the
productivity of land in the external sector tends to infinity as (1−
L) → 0. In this case, the land rent price becomes increasingly
high, therefore, External investors move their capital outside
the economy and reduce KE , which eventually goes to zero, so
that the economy ends up fully specializing in the local sector.
3.1. Dynamics without specialization
If Γ
(
A˜KαL
) 1
α
< 1 (see function (12)), then the representative
L-agent rents a positive fraction of her total land endowment to
be used by the representative E-agent. Moreover, the following
proposition holds:
Proposition 1. The equilibrium land rental price is equal to
rL = (1 − β)
(
B˜ (1 − τ)
) 1
1−β ( β
rK
) β
1−β
Proof. In the context Γ
(
A˜KαL
) 1
α
< 1, the equilibrium land
rental price is given by:
rL = (1 − α) A˜KαL L−α =
= (1 − α) A˜KαL
[
Γ (A˜KαL )
1
α
]−α
=
= (1 − β)
(
B˜ (1 − τ)
) 1
1−β ( β
rK
) β
1−β

4Remember that A˜ = A/(1 + aP)
When Γ
(
A˜KαL
) 1
α
< 1, the dynamics of the capital invested
in the L-sector is given by:
K˙L = s
[
A˜KαL L
1−α + rL(1 − L)
]
− γKL =
= s
[
α Γ1−α
(
A˜KαL
) 1
α
+ (1 − β)
(
B˜ (1 − τ)
) 1
1−β ( β
rK
) β
1−β ]
− γKL
(16)
while the time evolution of P is represented by:
P˙ = (δ − ητ)sYE − εP =
= (δ − ητ) B˜ 11−β
( β
rK
(1 − τ)
) β
1−β (1 − Γ (A˜KαL ) 1α ) − εP (17)
The system of Eqs. (16)-(17), therefore, represents the dynam-
ics of the economy in the case without specialization.
3.2. Dynamics with specialization
If Γ
(
A˜KαL
) 1
α ≥ 1 (that is, above the curve (15) in the plane
(P, KL)), the representative L-agent uses all her land endow-
ment to the production activity of the L-sector, that is L˜ = 1.
The dynamics of the economy in the case with specialization is
described by the equations:
K˙L = s
(
A˜KαL
)
− γKL (18)
P˙ = −εP (19)
4. Stationary states
Since a stationary state in which the economy is specialized
in the external sector does not exist, two types of stationary
states may be observed:
• the stationary state A1 = (P,KL) =
(
0,
( sA
γ
) 1
1−α
)
, in which
the economy is specialized in the local sector, and the
pollution level is equal to zero;
• stationary states in which both sectors coexist5.
The following proposition illustrates the conditions under
which the stationary state when the economy is specialized in
the local sector exists.
Proposition 2. The state A1 =
(
0,
( sA
γ
) 1
1−α
)
is a stationary state
of the system (18)-(19) if and only if
A ≥
(γ
s
)α [ 1 − α
(1 − β)(B(1 − τ)) 11−β ( βrK )
β
1−β
]α−1
(20)
When existing, it is always locally attractive (see Fig. 1(b)).
5Numerical simulations, presented in Section 5, have shown that two sta-
tionary states of this type may be observed: A (attractive) and S (saddle point).
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Fig. 1. Isoclines.
Parameter values: A = 1, B = 2, a = 5, b = 2, α = 0.65, β = 0.35, δ = 0.5,
r = 0.1, s = 0.6, η = 1, ε = 0.55, γ = 0.19.
Proof. According to the system (18)-(19), it holds that K˙L = 0
for:
KL =
[ sA
γ(1 + aP)
] 1
1−α
The dynamics (18)-(19) admits an unique stationary state A1 =
(P,KL) =
(
0,
( sA
γ
) 1
1−α
)
if and only if A1 lies above the separatrix
KL = sKL (see function (15)), i.e, if sKL(0) ≤ ( sAγ ) 11−α , that is:
A ≥ (
γ
s )
α
Γα(1−α)
=
(γ
s
)α [ 1 − α
(1 − β)(B(1 − τ)) 11−β ( βrK )
β
1−β
]α−1
While the Jacobian matrix of the system (18)-(19), calculated
at the stationary state A1 is:
J(A1) =
 −(1 − α)sA˜Kα−1L −αsAKαL0 −ε

with strictly negative eigenvalues: −(1−α)sA˜Kα−1L < 0 and ε <
0. Therefore, when the stationary state A1 exists, it is always
locally attractive. 
Proposition 2 affirms that A1, when existing, is always
locally attractive, and it lies always above the separatrix sKL
(where, L˜ = 1). From numerical simulations it emerges that
if the pollution tax is low enough with respect to the impact of
the external sector on pollution, the economy cannot fully spe-
cialize in the local sector (see Fig. 1(a)). This result is intuitive:
the pollution tax enters as a cost in the maximization problem
(3) of External investors.
Otherwise, if the economy is not specialized in the local
sector, the stationary states of the system (16)-(17) are given by
the solutions of the system of equations:
0 = s
[
α Γ1−α
(
A˜KαL
) 1
α
+ (1 − β)
(
B˜ (1 − τ)
) 1
1−β ( β
rK
) β
1−β ]
− γKL
0 = (δ − ητ) B˜ 11−β
( β
rK
(1 − τ)
) β
1−β (1 − Γ (A˜KαL ) 1α ) − εP
(21)
From system (21), we obtain that K˙L = 0 for:
KL = F(P) :=
s(1 − α)sKL
γ sKLΓα − αs (22)
and P˙ = 0 for:
KL = G(P) := sKL − εP(1 + bP) 11−β sKL
(δ − η)B 11−β
(
β
rK
(1 − τ)
) β
1−β
(23)
Two cases can occur:
i) if δ − ητ ≤ 0, i.e., the pollution tax τ is sufficiently high
with respect to the impact of the external sector on pollu-
tion (measured by the parameter δ) and the positive im-
pact of environmental defensive expenditures (measured
by the parameter η), then from Eq. (17) it holds that
P˙ < 0 for every P > 0, and, therefore, there are no sta-
tionary states with P > 0 and the trajectories tend toward
the axis P = 0.
ii) if δ−ητ > 0, then the curve KL = G(P) lies always below
the separatrix sKL(P) and stationary states, in which both
sectors coexist in a context with P > 0, can exist.
Moreover, G(0) = sKL(0), i.e., the curve KL = G(P) and
the separatrix KL = sKL(P) have the same intercept on the axis
P = 0. It is not possible to demonstrate analytically how many
intersection points may be observed; however, from numerical
simulations it emerges that at most two stationary states with
P > 0 exist, i.e., points A and S (see Figs. 1(a) and 1(b) and
Figs. 2(a) to 2(c)).
Global dynamics of system (5)-(6) is characterized by the
following result.
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Proposition 3. The set:
Ω = {(P,KL) : 0 ≤ P ≤ P∗ and 0 ≤ KL ≤ K∗L}
where
P∗ :=
δ − ητ
ε
B
1
1−β
[ β
rK
(1 − τ)
] β
1−β
,
K∗L > max
[( sA
γ
) 1
1−α
, K̂L
]
and
K̂L is the maximum of the function (see (15)) KL = KL(P) ,
is positively invariant under the dynamics (5)-(6); every trajec-
tory starting outside Ω and enters it in finite time. When the
stationary state with specialization A1 = (P,KL) =
(
0,
( sA
γ
) 1
1−α
)
does not exist, then no sector definitively disappears from the
economy (both sectors coexist).
Proof. Considering equation (17), we can write:
P˙ = (δ − ητ)B˜ 11−β
[β
r
(1 − τ)
] β
1−β [1 − Γ(A˜KαL ) 1α ] <
< (δ − ητ)B˜ 11−β
[β
r
(1 − τ)
]
− εP ≤
≤ (δ − ητ)B 11−β
[β
r
(1 − τ)
] β
1−β − εP
Since the maximum value that B˜ can assume is B, then it holds
P˙ > 0 for:
P ≥ P∗ := δ − ητ
ε
B
1
1−β
[ β
rK
(1 − τ)
] β
1−β
Indicating with K̂L the maximum of the function (see (15))
KL = sKL(P) := 1
Γ(sA) 1α (that always exists), and remembering
that the value of KL in the stationary state A1 is given by
(
sA
γ
) 1
1−α ,
it holds K˙L < 0 for every KL > max
[(
sA
γ
) 1
1−α
, K̂L
]
. 
According to Proposition 3, the coexistence between sec-
tors is possible. Numerical simulations show that, if the pollu-
tion tax is high enough with respect to the impact of the exter-
nal sector on pollution, two stationary states may be observed,
A, locally attractive, and S , saddle point (see Fig. 1(b)). Oth-
erwise, if the pollution tax is low enough with respect to the
impact of the external sector on pollution, then the stationary
state A1 does not exists, and a unique stationary state A glob-
ally attractive exists (see Fig. 1(a)).
5. Simulations
This section presents the results of some numerical simu-
lations of the dynamics of our model. Three types of dynamic
regimes may be observed from numerical simulations:
a) the regime illustrated in Fig. 2(a) characterized by the
existence of a unique globally attractive stationary state
A in which both sectors coexist;
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Fig. 2. Phase diagrams.
Parameter values: A = 1, B = 2, a = 5, b = 2, α = 0.65, β = 0.35, δ = 0.5,
r = 0.1, s = 0.6, η = 1, ε = 0.55, γ = 0.19.
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b) the regime illustrated in Fig. 2(b) characterized by the
existence of two locally attractive stationary states: A1
(where the economy is specialized in the local sector) and
A (where both sectors coexist), and the basins of attrac-
tion of such states are separated by the stable branch of
the saddle point S ;
c) the regime illustrated in Fig. 2(c) where the stationary
state A1 is globally attractive and, consequently, the econ-
omy always specializes in the local sector;
Figs. 3(a) and 3(b) show bifurcation diagrams obtained, re-
spectively, varying the parameters τ and δ; the continuous lines
represent the stationary state A (except the black line L˜ that rep-
resent the stationary state A1), while the dashed lines represent
the stationary state S . Moreover, from numerical simulations
(shown in Figs. 2(a) to 2(c), and Figs. 3(a) and 3(b)), we can
infer the following main results:
i) if the pollution tax is low enough with respect to the im-
pact of the external sector on pollution, then a unique
globally attractive stationary state A exists in which both
sectors coexist (see Fig. 2(a));
ii) for intermediate values of pollution tax, with respect to
the impact of the external sector on pollution, the dy-
namics is bi-stable: there are two locally attractive sta-
tionary states, A1, in which the economy is specialized in
the local sector, and A, where both sectors coexist (see
Fig. 2(b)); the basins of attraction of A1 and A are sepa-
rated by the stable branch of S ;
iii) if the pollution tax is too high with respect to the im-
pact of the external sector on pollution, then the station-
ary state A1 becomes globally attractive, and the external
sector tends to disappear (see Fig. 2(c));
iv) two threshold values of the pollution tax exist, one such
that the economy specializes in the local sector, and
the other such that the external sector disappears (see
Fig. 3(a));
v) a threshold value of the impact of the external sector
on pollution exists, such that both sectors coexist (see
Fig. 3(b)).
These results are intuitive, and can be explained by the roles
of the pollution tax and the impact of production activities of
the external sector on pollution. A pollution tax low enough
with respect to the impact of the external sector on pollution at-
tracts foreign direct investments, since it enters as a cost in the
maximization problem (3), and the stationary state with special-
ization does not exist (see Fig. 3(a)). On the contrary, when it
is high enough with respect to the impact of the external sector
on pollution, then for the External investors is more reward-
ing to move their capital outside the local economy and reduce
KE , which eventually goes to zero, so that the economy ends up
fully specializing in the local sector (see Fig. 2(c) and Fig. 3(a)).
Finally, the revenues coming from the pollution tax are used to
finance environmental defensive expenditures (see Eq. (6)). In
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Fig. 3. Bifurcation diagrams.
Parameter values: A = 1, B = 2, b = 2, α = 0.65, β = 0.35, r = 0.1, s = 0.6,
η = 1, ε = 0.55, γ = 0.19.
fact, if the pollution tax is low enough with respect to the impact
of the external sector on pollution, then the pollution level is
relatively high (see Fig. 2(a)). However, if it is high enough
with respect to the impact of the external sector on pollution,
then the pollution level is relatively low (see Fig. 2(b)).
Otherwise, a high enough impact of the external sector on
pollution with respect to the pollution tax attracts foreign direct
investments (see Fig. 3(b)). This result may confirm the pol-
lution haven hypothesis, i.e., the external firms relocate part of
their production to the countries where the environmental stan-
dards are less stringent, and, therefore, with the possibility of
increasing the pollution intensity.
6. Welfare of local land owners
In this section we compare the revenues of L-agents at A1
and at stationary states in which both sectors coexist. The remu-
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neration of capital KE invested by the representative E-agent is
rK KE while the revenues of the representative L-agent are given
by:
ΠL(P,KL) = sAKαL L1−α + rK(1 − L) =
=
αΓ1−α
(sAKαL ) 1α + (1 − β)(sB(1 − τ)) 11−β ( βrK ) β1−β i f KL < sKL(P)sAKαL i f KL ≥ sKL(P)
Therefore, the revenues of the representative L-agent in A1 =
(P,KL) =
(
0,
( sA
γ
) 1
1−α
)
are equal to:
ΠL(A1) = ΠL
(
0,
( sA
γ
) 1
1−α
)
= A
1
1−α
( s
γ
) α
1−α
The effects generated by the external investments on welfare of
L-agents can be better understood by comparing the dynamics
generated by the two-sector model considered in this paper with
the one-sector dynamics that would be observed in absence of
External investors:
K˙L = sAKαL − γKL (24)
According to the one-sector dynamics (24), the state KL =(
sA
γ
) 1
1−α is always a globally attractive stationary state and cor-
responds to the stationary state A1 of the two-sector model,
when existing. We shall compare the revenues of L-agents
obtained at the stationary state A1 with those obtained at a
generic state (P,KL) where both sectors coexist. Observe that
ΠL(A1) < ΠL(P,KL) holds if and only if the P and the KL satisfy
the condition:
A
α
1−α
( s
γ
) α
1−α
< αΓ1−α
(sAKαL ) 1α + (1+β)(sB(1−τ)) 11−β ( βrK ) (25)
Setting:
A
α
1−α
( s
γ
) α
1−α
= αΓ1−α
(sAKαL ) 1α + (1 + β)(sB(1 − τ)) 11−β ( βrK )
we obtain the indifference curve (IC):
αΓ1−α(A˜KαL )
α+(1−β)(B˜(1−τ)) 11−β
( β
1 − β
) β
1−β −AKαL = 0 (26)
with ΠL(A1) < ΠL(P,KL) (respectively, ΠL(A1) > ΠL(P,KL)) if
the state (P,KL) lies above (below) it, in the plane (P,KL). The
following proposition holds.
Proposition 4. The revenues of L-agents, evaluated at a
generic point (P,KL) where both sectors coexist, are greater
than in A1 (i.e., ΠL(A1) < ΠL(P,KL)), if the point (P,KL) lies
above the indifference curve (26). Conversely, if the point A lies
below the indifference curve (26), then ΠL(A1) > ΠL(P,KL).
According to Proposition 4, numerical simulations show
that if the pollution tax is high enough with respect to the impact
of the external sector on pollution, then a welfare-improving
growth path (i.e., Π(A1) < Π(A)) may occur (see Fig. 4(a)). On
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
τ
Π
Π(A1)
Π(A)
(a) δ = 0.2.
0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
δ
Π
Π(A1)
Π(A)
(b) τ = 0.18.
Fig. 4. Welfare analysis: relationship between revenues of local land owners
and pollution tax (a), and impact of the external sector on pollution (b).
Parameter values: A = 1, B = 2, a = 5, b = 2, α = 0.65, β = 0.35, r = 0.1,
s = 0.6, η = 1, ε = 0.55, γ = 0.19.
the contrary, if the pollution tax is low enough with respect to
the impact of the external sector on pollution, then a welfare-
reducing growth path (i.e., Π(A1) > Π(A)) may occur (see
Fig. 4(a)). Moreover, a welfare-improving growth path may
also occur if the impact of the external sector on pollution is
high enough with respect to the pollution tax (see Fig. 4(b)).
From numerical simulations shown in Figs. 5(a) and 5(b),
and Figs. 6(a) and 6(b), we can infer to the following main re-
sults6:
i) an increase of the pollution tax may have positive effects
on Π(A) (see Fig. 5(a)) and on both local and external ca-
6Notice that the revenues of L-agents at stationary state in which the econ-
omy is specialized in the local sector (Π(A1)) are invariant to an increase of the
pollution tax or of the impact of the external sector on pollution (see Fig. 5(a)
and Fig. 6(a)).
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Fig. 5. Welfare analysis: relationship between pollution tax and revenues of
local land owners (a), and both capitals (b).
Parameter values: A = 1, B = 2, a = 5, b = 2, α = 0.65, β = 0.35, r = 0.1,
s = 0.6, η = 1, ε = 0.55, γ = 0.19.
pitals (see Fig. 5(b)), since decreases the pollution level,
and, therefore, increases the productivity of both sectors;
ii) an increase of the impact of the external sector on pollu-
tion may have negative effects on Π(A) (see Fig. 6(a)) and
on both local and external capitals (see Fig. 6(b)), since
increases the pollution level, and, therefore, decreases the
productivities of both sectors;
In summary, if the pollution level is relatively high, then the
productivity of both sectors decreases. Therefore, the revenues
of Local land owners decrease and External investors move
their capital outside the economy. This does not occur only if
the pollution tax is high enough and the impact of the external
sector on pollution is low enough, respectively (see Figs. 4(a)
and 4(b)).
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Fig. 6. Welfare analysis: relationship between impact of the external sector on
pollution and revenues of local land owners (a), and both capitals (b).
Parameter values: A = 1, B = 2, a = 5, b = 2, α = 0.65, β = 0.35, r = 0.1,
s = 0.6, η = 1, ε = 0.55, γ = 0.19.
7. Conclusions
The foreign direct investments in land have increased sub-
stantially in the last ten years, and have recently been object of
several empirical studies. However, to our knowledge, there is
not yet a satisfactory theoretical model to explain them. The
paper has investigated the possible effects of FDI in land on a
small open economy with two sectors, external and local, and
heterogeneity of agents, external investors and local land own-
ers. Both sectors are negatively affected by pollution, but only
the external sector is polluting. Hence, we assume the possibil-
ity for the local government to tax the production activities of
the external sector to finance environmental defensive expendi-
tures.
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Numerical simulations show that the dynamics of the model
may be bi-stable. The stationary states in which there is spe-
cialization in the local sector and in which both sectors coexist
are locally attractive. The basins of attraction of such states are
separated by the stable branch of a saddle point. However, from
numerical simulations it emerges that if the pollution tax is low
enough with respect to the impact of the external sector on pol-
lution, then the specialization in the local sector does not occur
and local agents have to support relatively high values of pollu-
tion. On the contrary, if the pollution tax is high enough with
respect to the impact of the external sector on pollution, then
the specialization in the local sector may occur and local agents
have to support relatively low values of pollution.
A welfare-improving growth path may occur only if the pol-
lution tax is high enough and the impact of the external sector
on pollution is low enough, respectively. In such a context, the
revenues of local agents at the stationary state in which there
is coexistence between sectors are greater than at the stationary
state in which the economy is specialized in the local sector.
However, on the contrary, if the pollution tax is low enough and
the impact of the external sector on pollution is high enough,
respectively, then a welfare-reducing growth path may occur.
Foreign direct investments are attracted by a low enough
pollution tax and a high enough pollution intensity, respectively.
However, these parameters have positive effects on pollution
level and, therefore, negative effects on productivity of both
sectors. Therefore, a policy oriented to attract polluting FDI
decreases the welfare of local agents and for external investors
is more rewarding to move their capital outside the local econ-
omy in the long run.
On the contrary, a high enough pollution tax and a low
enough impact of the external sector on pollution, respectively,
can protect local capital accumulation and defend local agents
from environmental degradation. Moreover, due to the rela-
tive low negative effects on both sector, for external investors
is more rewarding to keep their capital inside the local econ-
omy. Therefore, an environmental policy implemented with a
high enough pollution tax can exploit the FDI to increase the
welfare of local agents.
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